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Restructuring and repositioning Shenzhen, China’s new mega city

Abstract
Shenzhen, a new mega city founded under China’s ‘open door’ policy, has experienced dramatic urban development over the past thirty years. From humble beginnings as a fishing village before the 1980s, it benefited from locational advantage next to Hong Kong, an autonomous city with a global role in finance and trade. Shenzhen was first among cities in China to adapt the capitalist world’s urban development practices to an indigenous, centrally controlled land management system. As a new city, Shenzhen may best represent the role of planning in a time of economic transition. Urban planning in Shenzhen was ambitious in its reach, using ‘experimental reform’ as a vehicle for institutionalizing changes in management of the land resource. These reforms became generalized in China, leading to a recent decline in academic investigation of Shenzhen. While the city as ‘reformer’ seems to have run its course, new challenges upset the old assumptions and call for more research. Today, as industry moves inland away from increasingly costly coastal areas, the city is grappling with the need to restructure its economic base. The city has undertaken major infrastructural projects in a bid to secure its role as a major transhipment hub and logistics command centre, while also developing a rail-based mass transit system. The regeneration of disused industrial land and ‘urban villages’, built up to accommodate at low cost a huge factory workforce, are important ongoing city programmes. While the city extends its infrastructure to connect more effectively with the rest of the Pearl River Delta (PRD) and with Hong Kong, more fundamental questions surround its role within a restructuring regional economy. Ambitions for international stature, bolstered by a large and young population base, a world-class port and modern facilities are challenged by a rapidly evolving regional economy.

1. Introduction
It has long been recognized that the pace of economic change in developing societies is quickening. If it took one hundred and fifty years to go from coal-fuelled industry to the information economy in north-western Europe, and half that in Japan, in China the time for such transformation might be halved yet again. Shenzhen provides the first signs of rapid de-industrialisation and restructuring in the boom environment of the Pearl River Delta of Guangdong province. Sometimes referred to as “the world’s factory”, this production powerhouse is undergoing a structural transformation that is also a highly visible spatial transformation. While the manufacturing and distribution activities that are the mainstay of the economy developed at break-neck speed, the same cannot be said for research and development, universities and cultural industries. The hothouse economy of Shenzhen, in particular, has been slow to produce the educational and cultural institutions that are closely associated with contemporary post-industrial societies.
	This rapid change challenges conventional long-range planning as the very economic and geopolitical foundations of the city are undermined. The pace and complexity of change in Shenzhen has instigated sudden and frequent shifts in policy priorities in the local government, often placing the local planning bureaucracy in a reactive position. Also, with the city not fully built out and major parts of planned infrastructure yet to be constructed, planners are also coping with structural change in the very areas for which they are planning infrastructure. Such a situation has certainly called into question the usefulness of rigid master plans, even when they are revised every five years. Some have even questioned the usefulness of planning in such a context, claiming that developments are increasingly difficult to foresee. As a consequence, they argue for a managerial and coordinating function for planning, which necessarily means the suppression of the plan-making function. Others argue that even more planning is needed to cope with the pace of change. It is argued that growing uncertainty in the development market is in large part attributable to short-term vision and narrowly defined market-based principles. A sustained research programme would provide greater stability to markets and reduce waste in expensive infrastructure. The arguments are not unique to Shenzhen, of course, but they have particular poignancy in this development hotbed.
At the same time, there is as yet no integrated view of the planning challenge facing Shenzhen as it restructures and attempts to reposition itself within the system of Chinese cities and at a global scale. Multiple demands on the planning system, coming from various sectors of the local and regional economy are not well coordinated in spite of good will to do so. The rapidity of the changes and new economic pressures arising from world economic developments, have made for an increasingly complex planning agenda. The chief purpose of this presentation is to highlight some of the difficulties facing decision-makers with regard to major planning decisions in Shenzhen. While at first glance, singular policy approaches suggest themselves with regard to these issues, when one examines the agenda more closely, one might appreciate the complexity of the decision-making, the trade-offs implied and the sophistication required of urban planning in such a context. It is important that we appreciate the challenge of Shenzhen thirty years after its founding and improve our ability to deal with it, in part because other cities in China will soon face a similar set of difficulties. We also need to think about the contribution of planning in the context of rapid, structural change in an urban region.
Shenzhen attracted researchers largely because it is a very large-scale experiment in Chinese urbanisation following market liberalisation. The city is seen variously as a harbinger of things to come, an exception that was designed to be such, or an exemplar of urban experimentation (Zhu, 1996; Leaf, 1996). The development process itself has attracted attention. For example, Ng (2003) draws links between socio-economic development and spatial planning during the city’s extremely rapid development phase, critiquing in particular the development control process. Inasmuch as this control process is a direct consequence of a hierarchical and authoritarian system of government, the analysis calls into the question the ability of government to manage development consistently and with a coherent set of policies. Bruton et al. (2005) review the ‘learn as you go’ and ‘experimental learning’ approaches of Shenzhen during the earlier years of economic reform and rapid development in the city. In the context of rigid statutory plans and singular visions that prevailed into the liberalised market era after 1978, Shenzhen’s experimentation can legitimately be seen as innovation. Other researchers place Shenzhen in the context of the Pearl River Delta economic area, documenting large-scale land-use change, inter-city competition and regional infrastructure development (Enright and Scott, 2003; Yeh et al., 2006; Hu, 2005). While the substantial powers of the local government might make the city appear masters in their own house, in fact the city’s evolution has been and is increasingly so, bound to the future of its neighbours. The physical and spatial outcomes of local experimentation have also garnered attention. Cartier (2002) critically examines the urban design strategies of Shenzhen in light of contemporary international trends. She emphasises the postmodern gloss of recent government-led projects that obscure what remains a fundamentally modernist local view of the city as a planned object. Increasingly, however, the transformation of the city is beyond the direct purview of modernist planning and architectural imagination. The urban villages are the most spectacularly visible examples of urban transformation and increasingly the object of investigation especially within China. The process and physical outcomes of redevelopment of the early industrial zones have also attracted interest. It is thought these new market-led redevelopment projects provide an excellent laboratory for new methods for regulating the market. The academic research conducted so far makes it clear that Shenzhen is seen as a kind of laboratory within China, a position it continues to enjoy as it passes thirty years of age. The international interest of Shenzhen is in the process and outcomes of exceptionally rapid, planned development. It is one of the most important cases worldwide of a major new city, with all the attendant problems that size and modernity bring. The world needs to pay attention to this case as the way is paved either for sustained growth of primate cities or, as seems more desirable, for many new cities throughout the developing world. 
The timetable and agenda for the development of Shenzhen makes it a unique case in China. No other city with several millions population has been created within an essentially rural environment over the past thirty years of the liberalised market, although urbanisation continues at a massive scale throughout China. For example, the Pudong extension of Shanghai was also founded as a designated economic zone, but is an essential part of contemporary Shanghai, tied physically with four bridges, two tunnels and the metro system. Other special economic zones are tied to existing cities of various sizes. Shenzhen was alone in its inception as a special economic zone but one that managed to capture many of the prerogatives of established large cities. Many other ‘new’ cities in China were in fact small cities of a few hundred thousand population that became cities of around one million population–cities such as Wenzhou, Hangzhou and Suzhou. Other new planned cities, such as the Bohai Bay ‘ecocity’ project, Caifeidian new town near Tianjin and Tangshan, should also attain populations of several hundred thousand or one million, but may remain under the control of established local governments. The unique geopolitical context that gave rise to Shenzhen did not have parallels anywhere else in China. That context could also be seen as unique to the period following market liberalisation and the need for a privileged channel of communication with the outside world that Shenzhen offered. Shenzhen was alone in its category of new mega cities, following the United Nations definition of cities of more than ten million people. As Shenzhen’s growth took off in the 1980s, it became clear that Shenzhen was a distinct local player, needing sufficient powers to grapple with a unique set of circumstances relating to its productive base, its reliance on exports and a particular tax and regulatory regime. This is in sharp contrast with Shanghai’s Pudong area, for example, where the special economic zone was seen as the new CBD for Shanghai, but also as a kind of decompression chamber for the overcrowded and dilapidated quarters of the traditional city. In other words, the agenda for Pudong was really the agenda for Shanghai. In contrast to these cases, Shenzhen took on an independent role within the region and in the country as a whole.  
With an international boundary on one side and an internal boundary from the rest of the mainland China on the other, at least for the first two decades of its development, Shenzhen enjoyed substantial independence with respect to other jurisdictions within the Pearl River Delta. The international boundary with Hong Kong insulated Shenzhen to some extent from centrist policy, particularly in the context of investment coming across that international border. Shenzhen successfully argued for special tax and import-export regulations to enable inward investment. Guangzhou, historically dominant in the Pearl River Delta, could have regarded the emergence of Shenzhen as a threat to its traditional position in Guangdong province particularly, and South China generally. But arguably, Shenzhen’s geographical position in a relatively rural and isolated corner of Guangdong province was an enabling factor in the emergence of a very large city with substantial control over its own territory and development. The first decade of the liberalised market enabled Shenzhen to grow much more quickly than Guangzhou, fuelling intra-regional rivalry which continues today.
The powers it acquired early enabled the city to take on a building effort that has been formidable in scale and extent. Innovations in land management, leading to generalised changes throughout China, were often first tried in Shenzhen. These innovations have attracted researcher interest (Bruton et al, 2005; Zhu, 1996) for the implications they have for the quality of the environment achieved through planning, for example. The city’s role in instigating change in the context of an evolving land management system in China as a whole is also of substantial interest. The fiscal and regulatory environment for land transactions continues to evolve. The land management system has become increasingly market-oriented in its practices (Zhu, 1996), as real estate itself has evolved into the Chinese city’s main commodity. The reform is driven in part by a fiscal impasse which is imminent for cities like Shenzhen, that have completely exhausted their land resource. It has long been recognized that the one-time payment for a long-term lease on government-owned land cannot provide sustained revenue for the city, yet fiscal alternatives have been slow to emerge. But emerge they must, if cities are to continue to consolidate their infrastructure and provide a higher quality environment.
The planned development of a territory thirty kilometres long by two to four kilometres in width in less than two decades of intensive development is itself a remarkable instance of rapid urbanisation. The urban planning responses that were set in motion in a changing economic context are of considerable interest in the field of urban planning. As will be seen later, the pace of growth was largely unforeseen, such that earlier spatial concepts were rapidly outdated. How the city grappled with shifting demands from the various sectors of the city as growth continued unabated for twenty years is also of intense interest. The difficulties of managing the process and maintaining goals as well as consistent means to achieve them have nevertheless been seriously challenged over this period of extremely rapid growth (Ng, 2003).   
	This article examines the planning agenda itself in an attempt to appreciate the challenge facing policy-makers. The plan of the article is as follows: First, the city is situated in geographical and economic terms, recalling its founding principles and the fundamental approach to its early planning. Second, the history of its planning and development is outlined, paying particular attention to the shift from the 1986 Plan to the 1996 Plan. Third, some aspects of current spatial and economic restructuring within the city are presented, along with the forces that propel that restructuring and some of the consequences that can already be identified. Fourth, some of the major planning challenges facing the Shenzhen government are considered. Fifth, some recent planning initiatives of the Shenzhen government are reviewed–initiatives with the intention to reposition the city for its new role in South China and internationally. In the final sections of the paper, a look ahead to the 2020 planning horizon allows us to consider the prospects of success of the current planning strategies. For this survey of urban planning in Shenzhen, the authors draw on a variety of sources and use different methods. The authors’ involvement in recent planning and design initiatives of the Planning Bureau, elaborated further on, included detailed background information on a variety of themes for the whole of Shenzhen. Many local informants, at all levels within the Planning Bureau, or in institutes working contractually with the Bureau, provided vital inside information on policies and their reformation. Certain important planning documents of the Planning Bureau provide the descriptive and explanatory materials accompanying urban plans and local development plans. Recent reports from consulting institutes to the Planning Bureau, including the China Academy of Urban Planning and Design (CAUPD) also provide a good gauge of policy drift in government inasmuch as they often reflect substantial input from the Bureau itself. Finally, the authors rely on direct knowledge acquired over more than a decade.

2. Rising local power and increasing inter-city competition 

Shenzhen may be the most impressive case of a new city in the post-reform era, because of the massive scale of the planning operation as well as its strategic location next to Hong Kong, but it is not unique. New cities have been created at an average rate of 11% per year in the post-reform era (Anderson and Ge, 2005), mostly through the growth of existing towns and districts or more rarely, as in the case of Shenzhen, as greenfield development. Cities have also been getting larger, expanding the ranks of mid-sized cities of several hundred thousand or a million inhabitants, while the largest cities grow more slowly (Anderson and Ge, 2005). This emerging pattern is to some extent the consequence of a redistribution of productive capacity from city centres to districts near the traditional city centre and often dependent upon it for guidance, with other centres of production springing up as national infrastructure develops. As a consequence, very large cities are growing more slowly, while those newly industrializing towns are growing most rapidly. Shenzhen’s nearest mainland neighbour and serious competitor for inward investment, Dongguan, is itself a new city of more than a million population. In this case, however, Dongguan is not administratively dependent on Shenzhen, but also does not have its range of powers. With a bigger land base and location on regional highway and rail networks, Dongguan has been remarkably successful in capturing new investment both from overseas and from Shenzhen. With an urbanized population in China that hovers around 40% today (CSY, 2004) and a rate of urbanisation varying between 1.3% and 1.5% annually, up to 20 m rural inhabitants become officially urbanised yearly. Some have argued that the pace of urbanisation is in fact too slow given the rate of economic growth (Chang and Brada, 2006), while others point out that the official urbanisation statistics fail to account for much of the development in rural areas near cities. Such massive urbanisation, even if less than what might be expected in the ongoing economic boom, must lead to the creation of new cities in the jurisdictional system in China. 
District and county authorities have every interest in seeing their jurisdictions transform to city status, which immediately confers new planning powers, greater fiscal capability and the means to attract more inward investment. The emergence of such new economic pôles has direct repercussions on the structural relations between urban centres in China. Cities are attempting to position themselves in a hierarchical and infrastructural system still under development, with the central government playing an important role in directing major national efforts in infrastructure investment. Thus, cities such as Shenzhen are facing serious competition from others vying for the same investment market (Xu and Yeh, 2005). Intense negotiations follow planned infrastructure such as the high-speed railway system. Some cities, such as Wuhan, are treated as hubs, others such as Tianjin are seen as satellites of other major cities, while other cities are by-passed entirely. A cluster of neighbouring districts, sharing boundaries and infrastructure, often compete with each other for status and investment.
	The growing competition between cities is accompanied by growing local autonomy, as fiscal responsibility has shifted from the national and provincial levels to the local. The substantial financial clout of the local government made it possible for the government to have a major say in where investment would occur and the form it would take. Oi (1992) refers to this growing economic role of the local government as local state corporatism. Shenzhen managed to obtain substantial autonomy quite early. For example, from 1997, its economic planning powers and administrative competence were equal to that of the provincial government (Shen 2007). It could effectively direct where private investments would occur by making infrastructure available and carrying out local development in support of the investment. The management of the land resource in the first instance provided a golden opportunity to control the scale and form of development and thereby foster a certain development culture. Parcels of several or several tens of hectares were typical in the areas implemented after the 1986 Plan, as the development industry acquired the ability to handle increasingly large projects. It is often suggested that larger projects enable the incorporation of amenities that are difficult to achieve in an accumulation of small projects. Senior planners also argued that more control could be exercised on larger parcels. An additional result of this preference for large projects on substantial parcels of urban land is the growth of development companies with every interest in participating in the local alliance of business and government interests. Such alliances have been seen elsewhere (Logan and Molotch, 1987) but have a particular character in China, in part because of the preponderant role of local government in development.
	It would not be accurate to conclude, however, that cities are entering a free market where only their own growth strategies count in the outcome. Although the central state may account for a diminishing proportion of city finances, Beijing’s financial clout is increasingly critical to outcomes in the nation-wide city system. Fiscal policies and major inter-provincial infrastructure-building remain the purview of central government. Centrally initiated policies leverage funds coming from a variety of sources, including state-owned companies. Even a concerted effort on the part of a conglomerate of investors and local interests must work within a policy framework that remains largely under the control of Beijing. The central government has been using this power to direct growth to the interior and western provinces as well as support Shanghai as China’s chief contender for global city status. The area around Bohai Bay in the north and near Beijing is also being strongly promoted with massive investment in Tianjin and in a new city imagined on the scale of Shenzhen. Such centrist economic planning has been accompanied by the accelerated growth of cities such as Chongqing and Chengdu in the west, Tianjin and Qingdao in the north. In this larger policy setting, Shenzhen is a vulnerable, if relatively wealthy, major player.
	This picture of a corporatist, local government financially autonomous on its own territory is also coloured by the system of political appointments. The central government controls appointments at the provincial level and has substantial influence on appointments at the city level, as a consequence. Party secretaries and mayors are career administrators who spend three to five years in one city before they move on. The perceived success of their administration leads to appointment in a higher-status city or even in a central government role. The need to set major development targets and reach them within time frames of two or three years follows from the appointment system, among other reasons. There is also the need to meet a unitary set of expectations, that acts to dampen enthusiasm for unique planning approaches to often unique local problems. As a consequence, Chinese cities look increasingly the same, as local administrations adopt almost identical development agendas. Such an approach, as we shall see later, is not without some serious consequences for local competitivity. The cultural attributes and unique building heritage that increasingly feature in the marketing campaigns of post-industrial cities worldwide have little chance in this environment. It would be unfair to suggest that the failure to foster a unique brand is ignored in China, but it is not clear how it can be achieved within the present administrative system. We return to this problem and some of the efforts to address it later, when looking ahead.  
	The Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ), inaugurated by the State Council in 1980, was one of the first and most successful of such zones designed to attract foreign investment to joint ventures. It was here that China’s leading politician, Deng Xiao Ping, chose to announce the ‘opening up’ policy (1978) that launched China’s ‘socialist market economy’. Shenzhen was granted planning powers equal to Guangzhou, the largest city in Guangdong province and fourth in China, as early as 1981. A succession of legislative innovations were visited upon Shenzhen in the 1980s, as the central government used the SEZ to experiment with market reforms (Zhu, 2004). For example, the first land auctions enabled the local government to exact market-based prices for land leases, filling its coffers and enabling it to undertake major infrastructure projects. The SEZ was spectacularly successful in attracting foreign investment, especially from Hong Kong, in support of a light manufacturing economy.  
The proliferation of such zones later made them less and less effective development vehicles, forcing cities to think about how else they could attract and retain investment. Many cities overzoned vast peripheral ‘economic’ zones on agricultural land, often equal in area to the developed city itself, in an effort to attract industrial development (Chen et al, 2008). These measures rendered much less attractive the particular locational and fiscal advantages that the economic zones could offer potential investors. There had to be other reasons to locate an industrial operation. Shenzhen’s early success could be attributed largely to its strategic location close to the ‘command’ centre of Hong Kong, with excellent port and logistics facilities. That early advantage led to the highest GDP per capita in the country, if unregistered residents are not counted. After 2000, it was no longer the mecca for light manufacturing it once was, but its new role was not yet fully defined. We return to this question later in the article when we consider Shenzhen’s prospects on the next planning horizon of 2020. The next sections deal with its internal growth and development over the past 28 years.      
Shenzhen recognized early that its port facilities–with the largest tonnage handled in the world if the two ports of Dachan and Yantian are combined–required excellent logistics with centres of production inland and with Hong Kong. The extension and paralleling of major expressways to carry freight from Dongguan, Huizhou, Guangzhou and smaller centres of production throughout Guangdong province made it possible for industries to reduce their production costs while favouring the rapid growth of Shenzhen’s two major ports. The promotion of the port became a necessity for the core city of the SEZ in situating itself as the command centre for the port and increasingly as a place for knowledge transactions. But such highway development also facilitated the rampant growth of the outer districts in a dispersed spatial plan that is difficult and expensive to service. Developments proceeded in proximity to this major infrastructure, using the new expressways and the national highways for the transport of goods and eventually of people (figure 1).
Shenzhen’s role in the larger Pearl River Delta has come increasingly to preoccupy local decision-makers. As a world factory for largely low-tech consumer products, it was ultimately vulnerable to competitive labour costs elsewhere and downturns in demand worldwide. The need to advance high-tech industry and research and development have been emphasised throughout the development history of Shenzhen, but has so far fallen far short of expectations or needs. The city has just one university of modest reputation and satellites of several reputable Chinese academic institutions, but the research effort that such institutions are supposed to bring to the local economy have so far been marginal. The city offers a lower cost environment for white collar support work and much less expensive housing than in neighbouring Hong Kong. But together, these assets do not constitute a coherent image of its future role. While Hong Kong moves strongly to remake itself as a financial, service and educational hub for the region and with world-class status, Shenzhen needs to find an appropriate role for itself. 
Shenzhen would like more linkages with Hong Kong, even if it could not achieve the elimination of the boundary entirely. New cooperative projects are constantly being launched to tie the cities together in a functional sense, if not in a legal sense. Hong Kong has been considerably less enthusiastic about Shenzhen’s agenda of cooperation, although its own future may be inextricably tied to the mainland. Arguably, the border has served Hong Kong well, in maintaining a unique legal and cultural environment that remains attractive to globalised business, while offering easy access into the China market. This theme of cooperation is taken up again at the end of the article when we consider Shenzhen’s prospects over the next decade.
As central government priorities shift to the centre, the western provinces and the north-east, Hong Kong also has reason to position itself strategically on the transport networks while aiming at certain structural positions vis-à-vis the Mainland. Hong Kong cannot afford to be cut adrift from the emerging network of PRD cities but is also not as central as Guangzhou. Initiatives to develop the western side of the PRD will benefit Guangzhou, that is already extending its reach southward and toward Zhongshan, the next city on the way to Zhuhai and Macao. Guangzhou is vying to regain regional pre-eminence as a centre of business and culture. Regional development in support of Guangzhou as an effective administrative and command centre for the region is not in the interest of Shenzhen, which would render their own city a coastal town with much less economic clout in the region. Shenzhen’s interest in building a coastal alliance of cities, is best exemplified in the proposal to build a massive bridge across the Pearl River estuary from the Bao’an district directly to Zhuhai via Hong Kong.
A fundamental difficulty of this regional competition between centres is the sameness of the projects intended to project this or that centre to pre-eminence. 

3. Urban plans, growth and spatial development 

Before 1978, the whole region was a rural backwater. The area east of the Pearl River estuary was inhabited since the Neolithic period by seafaring tribes, who also engaged in a little cultivation. A county seat named Xin’an was established in 1573. The British requisitioned uninhabited Hong Kong Island in 1842 and the so-called New Territories in 1860 from the weakened Qing government, altogether about one-third of the original county. The county was renamed Bao’an in 1913 to avoid confusion with another Xin’an county in north China. The proposal to found the first Special Economic Zone in 1979 accompanied the change of name to Shenzhen, in honour of a significant geographical feature: Locals referred to rivulets draining the hills and mountains as well as paddy drainage canals as ‘zhen’ while ‘shenzhen’ literally means deep drains. At the founding, the entire population was a mere 20,000 fishermen and farmers.
Shenzhen’s growth surpassed planned levels several times, rendering the spatial plans obsolete before they were completed. Growth was particularly spectacular during the 1980s, but continued to outpace virtually every major city in China through the 1990s as well (figure 2). In 1999, Shenzhen’s official population was 4.05 m, projected to grow to 4.2 m in 2005 and 4.3 m in 2010. In fact, the official population already is closer to 7 m. More importantly, the non-resident population, still known as the ‘floating population’ because they lack urban status, may equal the urban citizens in number. The thoughtful balance of functional requirements and spatial provisions inherent in plans such as that of 1986, could not cope with the explosive growth that subsequently occurred. The development of the SEZ was planned and executed largely according to plan. Except for the independent decision-making of urban villages within the SEZ, the territory is built up according to a clear, spatial plan. Part of this consistency is attributable to the power of the statutory planning process, and part to the maintenance of a certain vision of the city throughout most of its thirty-year history. This is a remarkable achievement given the immensity of the task and the constant renewal of the leaders and staff who amended and executed each of the five-year plans. But the same could not be said of the outlying districts, where power was more dispersed and where, generally speaking, there was less urban planning. It was these areas of the city that grew the fastest during the late 1980s through the 1990s. Their own sometimes chaotic development seriously challenged the planning vision of Shenzhen and remains one of the most difficult problems facing Shenzhen today.
The approach of the city administration from the beginning was the provision of the urban infrastructure in support of sustained growth in the form of extensive urban development. It directed development in support of growth and has done so consistently over the history of the city. Planners were seen as the technical support for providing the necessary infrastructure for economic growth, with a lesser role in designing the future of the city. The forces for development already operate at the extra-territorial level in South China, such that it would be understandable that a service role would be important. The city’s competitivity in markets, certainly those to which Shenzhen appears to aspire, rely increasingly on the city’s ability to attract. Urban planners are seen as having a major role in enhancing the city functionally, but also aesthetically, in order to assist the city in gaining competitive edge. 
The thirty years of development of Shenzhen are marked by a series of plans and planning documents that play a key role in the city’s short but highly significant planning history, contributing substantially to the spatial structure of the city. While a more exhaustive investigation of the documents and changes would be worthwhile, particularly in this case where the documentation is relatively complete, such work is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, the intention here is to describe the principles announced in the planning documents and how they were interpreted in plan forms and ultimately in built form. The succession of experiences with various planning experiments as the development proceeded rapidly over the territory fuelled modifications and continuities as we shall see in the plans.

2.1 Master planning within the SEZ (1986) – the ‘clustered linear’ model

Following the founding of the city in 1980, a series of studies led to the city’s first master plan, inaugurated in 1986, referred to as ‘the Master Plan of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (1986-2000)’. This master plan proposed a spatial allocation of major infrastructure and a spatial structure for the planned city expansion (figure 3). This plan is generally regarded as one of the most important documents on 1980s planning practice in China. The development of this plan was widely publicised in China and involved many professionals and academics. As a consequence, its features had an important impact throughout China, as many cities began to consider preparation of their master plans after the long hiatus of the Cultural Revolution. 
	According to this plan, the SEZ was designed to grow with development concentrated in a string of clusters along a central and city-scale development corridor, with Shennan avenue as the central, defining feature. In morphological terms, the planned development pattern was referred to as ‘strip-like with clustering’ or ‘clustered linear planning principle’ (dai zhuang zu tuan). This was a clear break from the core-periphery, monocentric morphology of Chinese cities that had prevailed for hundreds of years.
	The subsequent development of Shenzhen in the 1980s and 1990s reveals close adherence to the spatial principle. The development over this timeframe can be divided into different phases to describe how the city developed step-by-step: 1–Following the Gazette of the 1986 plan, Shenzhen began to invest in infrastructure to facilitate the development in the various urban clusters. Luohu area (eastern cluster), Shangbu area (central cluster) and Nanshan area (western cluster) were developed together with the provision of roads and utilities. Uses were assigned to large urban blocks to distinguish urban areas for living, production zones, commercial centres and park and recreation areas. The layouts and planned functions were designed to attract inward investment for manufacturing and trade. 2–With growing concern about the more rapid than expected growth of these designated urban clusters, the government initiated new development in Futian district to divert development pressures from the densely built-up areas of Luohu and Shangbu, in particular. The Futian cluster then became the focus of attention in the latter 1990s. 3–With the build-out of Shennan avenue, the urban clusters were able to link with each other, which encouraged in-fill along the main corridor, still in keeping with the principles laid out in the 1986 plan. 4–Two new highways, the Beihuan highway and the Binhe-Binhai expressway were added to supplement the capacity of Shennan avenue and improve connectivity among the various clusters.
	The growth model of clustering urban functions along traffic corridors played an important role in Shenzhen’s development history. The designation and successive development of urban clusters enabled the city to make full use of facilities in a time when Shenzhen had limited financial resources to carry out such infrastructural projects. The emphasis on a corridor of development enabled the further concentration and intensification of development within the clusters. The plan was frankly traffic-oriented but limited sprawl and wasteful development by emphasising the concentration of development in clusters. According to certain professional observers, the system had the merits of enabling structural and environmental improvements over a relatively short period, due in particular to the efficiency and flexibility of the building system (Wang, 2000; Zhao, 2004).

2.2 Comprehensive development of the whole municipality: the network model (1996)

To deal with the challenges of rapid industrialisation, especially in outlying areas, Shenzhen municipal government completed the city’s comprehensive plan (1996-2010) in 1996. This plan extended the planning boundary to the cover the whole municipality, the SEZ, Bao’an and Longgang districts (figure 4). The major focus of the new plan was to deal with undirected growth especially in areas outside the SEZ. This rapid growth was seen as disorderly, wasteful of land resources and out of keeping with the spirit of the earlier planning.  
	As a consequence, the 1996 plan implemented the ‘clustered linear’ urban structure of the earlier plan, then restricted to the SEZ, to the much larger area outside. Based on the previous Shennan avenue urban corridor and in keeping with the extended planning area over the entire city, the 1996 plan proposed a ‘multiple axes’ structure. The former eastern, central and western clusters remained linked by a central axis and constituted what was known as the ‘metropolitan area’. For the areas outside the SEZ, three axes extended the development in keeping with the growth of new towns and former outlying district centres. The three new axes were quite different from the central or metroplitan one, with the main focus on allocation of clustered sites for industrial development.
	The 1996 plan tried to implement a networked spatial system, which would connect the various parts of the city and, more importantly, to direct growth to achieve spatial balance and coherent, viable new clusters. The plan also tried to rein in disorderly development by proposing protected ecological zones and other green areas next to the proposed clusters. Some professionals commented that this form of dispersed development was in reality merely a recognition of the development reality of the time, rather than a serious effort at directing future development. The plan failed to achieve its main original purpose of controlling development, in recognizing and incorporating unplanned development in a larger spatial framework for Shenzhen. In effect, the plan set up a procedure for absorbing unplanned development, which resulted in a lack of development focus and inefficient use of the limited land resources and investment funds.

2.3 The urban development strategy (2030) and the revised comprehensive plan (2007-2020): the polycentric model

After 30 years of rapid growth, Shenzhen confronts some serious obstacles to further development, referred to in the planning reports as the ‘four difficulties’; namely, the lack of land resource, the shortage of water for urban use, over-crowding of the already developed urban areas, and environmental challenges. At the same time, the substantial productive capacity of Shenzhen faces great pressure from continually rising production costs, forcing the city to lead in industrial restructuring efforts and economic upgrading.
	A thorough review of the development experience over the last two decades, along with lessons learned from those experiences, together with a response to the emerging challenges and opportunities in this new transitional period informed the latest round of plan-making. In 2004, Shenzhen municipal government launched a strategic planning study, the ‘Shenzhen 2030 Development Strategy’, an attempt to deal with urban development problems that cannot be solved through existing comprehensive planning. The 2030 strategy considers the SEZ as well as outlying districts, but also examines areas beyond the city territory for their relevance to development opportunities within Shenzhen. In this way, the strategic plan suggests a shift from traditional blueprint planning towards the macro level and the long term.
	In terms of urban structure, the 2030 strategy proposes specialisation for different parts of the city, based on the review of both successful and failed aspects of the ‘clustered linear’ model and the ‘network’ models (SMG, 2004). For the purposes of strategic planning, the city is redivided into five sub-regions, spatially connected with each other with different axes and linked with the neighbouring cities of Hong Kong, Dongguan, Guangzhou and Huizhou. 
	Supporting documentation for the strategy suggests that Shenzhen is attempting to adapt Peter Hall’s (2006) polycentric urban development model as a way of organising a diversity of demands and self-generated development in various urban areas (SMG, 2004b). This suggestion is more clearly enunciated in the government’s latest planning effort, the revision of the city’s comprehensive plan, the ‘Urban Comprehensive Plan (2007-2020), inaugurated in 2006. In this latest development of the comprehensive plan, two city centres refer to Futian and Qianhai centres. The two centres are intended to complement each other but also serve as regional high-end clusters to attract high-value-added activities as well as services. The five proposed sub-centres aim to serve respective sub-regions of the city, by grouping office buildings, shopping, housing and transportation interchange facilities. One example of a sub-centre is the Guangming new town, designated as a high-technology industrial hub to support nearby clustered high-tech firms and industrial estates. Another is the Longhua sub-centre, which is expected to play a role as a regional transportation hub, with the city’s new train station as the centrepiece.
	This polycentric pattern advocated in the plan and represented in figure 5 tentatively suggests an answer as to how Shenzhen might tackle its problems, at least in spatial terms. Transportation connections with neighbouring cities are aimed at regional cooperation and synergies. Industrial types have been classified and assigned to specialised clusters according to location requirements and pressures on land resources. Finally, general economic upgrading is being managed by concentrating efforts on the functions, accessibility and environmental qualities of the various centres. In summary, the plan represents an attempt to accommodate all possible development opportunities from a variety of drivers in the economy, by offering multiple, targeted sites for growth.
	Admittedly, the city has had to deal with pressures that have, at least to some extent, escaped its control. However, supporting the development of so many widely separated centres seems questionable. With the exception of the existing Futian and Luohu ‘metropolitan’ centre, the proposed centres rely heavily on low-end manufacturing industries for their economic base. Although the centres are expected to facilitate spatial conditions in support of economic upgrading and industrial restructuring, they lack precedents to support this kind of dramatic transformation. Some planners argue that Shenzhen has proved capable of innovating in the face of the unknown and largely succeeding, giving confidence to such ambitious aims. Others suggest that this so-called long term development strategy is really a way of postponing hard choices while appearing to do something.
The implementation of such an extensive planning area with many simultaneous projects ongoing is administratively challenging and has given rise to a substantial amount of critical observation from Western perspectives. Arguments are raised for and against a local authoritarian regime’s ability to optimise the carrying-out of plans. Essentially, some argue that the executive power is quicker and more focussed, while others suggest that the lack of a check on executive power has all kinds of built-in inefficiencies. Decisions by fiat and a sometimes punishing schedule for the completion of major infrastructure have produced complete new developments in remarkably short time. But mistakes are sometimes made in the planning and in the execution as a result of the lack of time to carry out the necessary planning studies. The direct communications between developers and planning officers lead to governmental interference in planning outcomes as well as corruption. Downstream negative outcomes are never central to the local government’s concern, in part because most of the leaders will have moved on to other appointments before they are known. On balance, it is the speed of development that counts above all else in the present context. While city plans have been updated on a five-year basis since the implementation of the City Planning Act in 1989, they are also often modified by government fiat, in part because unforeseen needs arise in the fast-growing local economies of the large cities of the eastern seaboard, in part because local leaders can do so with impunity (Ma, 2004). To some extent, such changes seem reasonable at the time or can be fully justified in terms of some sectoral interest. In the context of extremely rapid growth, it would be difficult in any time to control all aspects of the planning process. At another and generally smaller level, major changes are made in uses and densities in ways that are not always possible to control. Observers are often critical of the instability of such localized decision-making, its openness to corruption and the difficulties it faces in following planning guidelines at the larger scale of consideration. 
Nevertheless, in most cases, in part because infrastructure is expensive and committing, plans at the master planning scale of consideration are necessarily quite stable. Statutory plans, once enacted, are very difficult to alter even if they often do not specify the level of detail that many planners consider to be critical to their success. This was particularly the case in Shenzhen, where a succession of expansion plans have given form to a major part of the SEZ territory and its linkages to the existing city.
	The strategies of land reclamation, building on steep, forested slopes as well as conversion of former industrial land to other urban uses, have managed the growth that was not already directed to ‘urban villages’ and the outlying districts of Longgang and Bao’an. But this process of land resource creation is nearing its end. In a study of remaining developable land published by the Planning bureau in 2001 (Shenzhen, 2001), just 8% of the urban land or 1,440 hectares, within the SEZ was classified as developable. Outside the SEZ, 23% of the urban-designated land or 11,844 hectares was classified as developable. Much of the potential resource has undoubtedly already been leased if not built up in the interim. Any further land resource creation would require radical and environmentally questionable initiatives–for example, further incursions into sensitive mountainous habitats or filling the Pearl River estuary.
	The topography of Shenzhen dictated an elongated form, with the city hemmed in by the border on one side and mountain slopes on the other. In a massive effort, remaining outcroppings and small hills were blown up and removed to produce a more or less level swath across the coastal plane. The overburden provided material for reclamation projects along Shenzhen Bay, Shekou, Dachan Island and Yantian coastal areas and enabled an urban swath covering an area approximately two by thirty kilometres. In contrast to Hong Kong, where nodal development was organised around a rail-based public transportation system (Bristow, 1989), Shenzhen opted to build roads and promote a car culture. But the form was to have its consequences on early infrastructure and infrastructural changes that characterised the years after the millenium. Two additional east-west express roads supplemented the early axis of Shennan avenue. Similarly, the centrally placed metro line 1 was originally thought sufficient for the corridor and was planned to run down the centre of Shennan avenue. First conceived as surface rail, the line was moved underground, following developments in Shanghai and Guangzhou. Line 1 will now be complemented with two more lines on parallel alignments. The formidable topographical barriers have encouraged land reclamation projects along extensive stretches of the waterfront, such that the built-up area between forested hill and sea is at least one kilometre in depth.
The build-up of outlying districts in Shenzhen occurred in spite of the efforts of the planners of the Shenzhen Planning Bureau to bring it under control. This process was particularly accentuated in Shenzhen, but can be observed throughout the system of rapidly developing Chinese cities (Deng et al, 2008). As land values rose within the SEZ with the exhaustion of the land resource, industries wanted to move to cheaper sites. At the same time, border restrictions were relaxed at eight checkpoints along the 130 km-long border between the SEZ and the two outlying districts. It is Shenzhen itself that has relaxed these controls at the border, although the border and the regulatory regime that accompanies it remain in place, by decision of the central government. However, during the period of most rapid growth in the population of Shenzhen from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s, it was the outlying districts that grew the fastest, as both industries and rural workers converged on Bao’an and Longgang (figure 2). Bao’an and Longgang belonged to Bao’an County, affiliated with the SEZ until 1993, when the two districts were joined with Shenzhen municipality. The districts themselves had sufficient local autonomy to promote their own growth in a vigorous way (Shen, 2007). Pre-existing rural villages exploited their opportunity for revenue generation by rebuilding their villages as worker dormitories and allowing industries to replace rice paddies. Although technically illegal, such actions were widespread, in part because an evident need for inexpensive housing near workplaces was not being addressed by local government. The imperatives of economic growth and revenue generation outweighed the need for a stable regulatory regime and coherent spatial practices. 
 
4. Linkages within the Pearl River Delta area

The planning of infrastructure between cities of the Pearl River Delta has been much less elaborate although there is more such activity than ever today. Cities saw themselves as competitors. Guangzhou developed its own container port as regional traffic tended to concentrate in Shenzhen’s container ports. Hong Kong considered its competitive edge in container handling with respect to Shenzhen. Zhuhai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen all built new airports with international pretensions, while Hong Kong’s own new airport is in a class by itself for its volume of traffic and its international connections. Guangzhou and Shenzhen have opened and are continuing to build metro systems. Dongguan, Foshan, Zhuhai and Macao are all planning to build mass transit rail systems as well. These last three cities have a tenth or less of the population of Shenzhen but contend that they need similar modern infrastructure to operate competitively with the big cities of the region. At the same time, it is increasingly recognized that the future of any one of the cities is intimately linked with the future of the others. Increasing levels of exchange of all kinds between cities within the region is prompting considerable investment in infrastructure like the Shenzhen to Guangzhou high-speed rail line, which travels at up to 220 km/hr and makes the trip from Luohu to Guangzhou East Station in 40 minutes.
	Until now, there has been a single major axis of development in Guangdong province, extending from Guangzhou, through Dongguan to Shenzhen and then Hong Kong. The west side of the Pearl River also ‘begins’ at Guangzhou, extending through Foshan, Zhongshan, Zhuhai and finally Macau. However, this axis never developed to the extent of the eastern axis. Macau, much smaller than Hong Kong and without the major port facilities, has elected to develop a different set of activities, most notably entertainment and leisure-related activities such as gambling. Zhuhai, enjoying a relatively good environment and unspoiled waterfront, has developed as a retirement centre and mainland version of Macau. Zhongshan and Foshan remain provincial backwaters, set in a rich agricultural basin. Plans are in preparation for more aggressive development of this western axis. The western side has a much more extensive land base, relatively free of constraining topography as well as more abundant water resources. Guangzhou clearly stands to gain from the development of the western axis and has promoted the development of the western axis through proposals such as a new railway hub, a university town and highway infrastructure. Shenzhen is keen on the development of a new bridge to span the mouth of the Pearl River, which would eventually link future productive capacity in the western axis with its own port. If this last plan is realized, a more complete network of highway and rail links would join the two sides of the Pearl River Delta.
	The de-industrialization of Shenzhen and Dongguan is being countered at provincial levels with a plan to promote industrial development farther north in Guangdong province. It can be expected that new highway infrastructure will accompany the industrial parks now under development. If cities such as Huizhou, Qingyuan and Heyuan take up the industrial infrastructure fast departing the PRD, then much larger regional synergies can be expected. So far, this larger integrated region, sometimes referred to as the Greater Pearl River Delta, including Hong Kong and Macau, has not materialised, however.
Shenzhen is suspended between an imperative to play a significant role in the larger PRD, and on the development of greater links with Hong Kong. The two objectives are somewhat contradictory, however. In order for Shenzhen to maximise the agglomerative effects of the Hong Kong presence, they need to establish close physical ties, most easily done by building from the border. The first major crossing at Luohu was soon supplemented with Shatoujiao (1985) and Huanggang (1989), more recently with the new bridge across Shenzhen Bay (2006) and the proposed Liantang boundary control point. Passenger crossings have been greatly improved by building a second crossing at Futian, directly connected to Hong Kong’s mass transit system (MRT). These links facilitate movement between business districts, but also between workplaces in Hong Kong and housing in Shenzhen. To some extent, these infrastructural investments have paid off as high-quality investments have followed to Shenzhen. On the other hand, linkages with the greater PRD are seen firstly as industrial ones, allowing the productive hinterland to access Shenzhen’s ports. The increasing burden of container trucks on the highways, the destruction of the waterfronts for industrial highways and ports and the resulting continued lowering of air quality across the city contradict these upgrading efforts.  Because of its position between Hong Kong and the fast-emerging industrial hinterland, Shenzhen faces enormous opportunity and the threat of environmental decline. So far, the city is following a course to strengthen its industrial base in spite of environmental costs, all the while attempting to establish the city as a regionally pre-eminent corporate and decision-making centre.
An ongoing discussion since 2004 concerns the increasing rate at which firms are closing in the context of a generally worsening business environment. The once-successful labour-intensive PRD model seems to be approaching its end as the land resource is exhausted, labour costs become uncompetitive and the rise in the value of the RMB threatens the export-oriented regional economy. In general, the major players of the PRD are reluctant to see other regions benefit from an increasing proportion of economic development and urban growth, spurred on by nationally-supported projects such as the Beijing Olympics, the 2010 Shanghai Expo, the Tianjin Financial Center and the Caofeidian National Development Zone. Building a more competitive PRD is central to current discussions in governmental circles.
	At present, there is a government-led effort to promote economic restructuring throughout the PRD; for example, the ‘Guidance for directing regional industrial transfer and distribution’ (2008). According to this plan, labour-intensive and material-dependent industries will be encouraged to transfer to the eastern, western and northern areas of Guangdong province. The ‘industrial transfer’ to the outlying areas of the province is being achieved through the development in inland locations of many industrial parks; examples include Shantou Industrial Park and Huizhou Technology Park, both designed to received industries transferring from Shenzhen. If the transfer is successful, it will undoubtedly lead to a series of economic, social and spatial changes across Shenzhen and the whole of Guangdong province, only the outlines of which can be seen at present.
	The increasing importance given to urban and regional planning in the shaping of the greater PRD region, or the whole of the Guangdong province can be seen in particular in cooperative projects. For example, at the trans-border level, several planning studies have been designed with regional cooperation in mind, including the development of the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Lok Ma Chau Loop area. At the PRD regional scale inter-city projects have initiated regional synergies; for example, the inter-city railway network linking Shenzhen, Dongguan and Guangzhou. 
	It is clear that communications and transactions between cities are constantly increasing. In this increasingly complex environment, the planning system is not capable of handling the synergistic effects of policies and projects. There is no systematic research on the planning that has gone on for the last thirty years, so little accumulated knowledge of the effects of various planning policies. Planning horizons are short when longer-term visions are needed. Finally, as this article tried to demonstrate, there are many issues of importance that need more systematic and informed investigation to be tackled with confidence.
Shenzhen remains at the forefront of much urban innovation in China. It now faces challenges of quite a different kind than characterised its first twenty-five years of development. During those heady years of unbridled economic growth, the challenge was largely one of meeting the demand for space and infrastructure. Now, population and economic growth follow the attenuating curve that might be expected of a city of more than ten million people. But dark clouds obscure the horizon.




Shenzhen’s urban design history could be divided into three phases, if one wanted to use the physical manifestations for illustration. The first was the urban development of the early 1980s in Luohu District; second was a spatial plan of the SEZ as a whole with a particular set of spatial and physical characteristics; third is the present era of structuring developments aimed at the regional scale. A brief presentation on each follows. 
Luohu was laid out in grid form in relation to the Kowloon-Canton Railway station at the border crossing, also the location of the Shenzhen to Guangzhou railway. The original city form was inspired by the presence of pre-existing settlements and the organic form of the boundary itself. The block sizes and parcels anticipated a scale of development commensurable with that of parts of Hong Kong. The early plan for a walkway system also copied the already well developed walkway system, the elevated open and enclosed pedestrian system in Central on Hong Kong Island. In the Shenzhen case, the walkway system never developed as in Hong Kong and lost all relevance when the city opted for an underground rail system. Some parts of this aborted walkway system can still be seen in Luohu. Most of the streets in Luohu were narrow, just two to four traffic lanes, enclosing blocks that were on the Hong Kong size model. Most urban blocks were unenclosed, hosting multiple uses and street-level commerce in particular. This somewhat expedient plan to develop an urban centre quickly with good accessibility in the region informed much of what went on in this phase of development, not to be repeated in the same fashion in subsequent developments. Some observers felt that as a new district in a new city, Luohu lacked distinctiveness and could hardly be seen as newer than comparable areas of Kowloon in Hong Kong, for instance. As private cars began to invade the district, some planners felt it did not meet the needs of a motorised population. High density, limited on-site parking facilities and an irregular planning layout were seen as characteristics not to be repeated in later developments. 
In spite of these perceived drawbacks, Luohu is one of two city areas with lively streetlife and a vibrant commercial sector. Its new shopping malls are more successful than others in the city, while some of the recent housing, in spite of crowded conditions and difficult access, is some of the most expensive in the city. Not all of the district has been so successful, however. Some of the early housing projects look old and sub-standard. 
The planning for Futian District, lying immediately to the west of Luohu District follows a more formalist and representational urban form, with its centrepiece the government and business heart of the whole development. An already established pattern of chequerboard plans of working districts, residential districts and green spaces is carried over into this new development. The large proportion of land area given over to green space in general sets Shenzhen aside in the system of Chinese cities, although many efforts elsewhere are setting themselves similar objectives. The planners imagined the major roads lined and buffered with extensive green area. Today, the main east-west urban thoroughfare in Shenzhen, Shennan avenue, is lined with a green park for several kilometres. Early planning documents made much of the insistence on green verges along all major infrastructure and the suppression of walls in the urban landscape, a substantial innovation in Chinese cities where the enclosing wall has always featured prominently. The green theme is carried into the park and reserve lands. Steep, vegetation-covered hills are never more than a few kilometres away, forming an important backdrop and structural limit for the swath of development that is the 391 square kilometres of the SEZ.
This chequerboard of distinct sets of uses was divided by urban roads on a broad grid, with an expressway system at the outer edges of the whole. Set up to support road-based transport, it also incorporated the space anticipated for mass rapid transit. It was a system of broad avenues with planted verges in which developments could be placed, in a frankly modernist conception of accessibility to jobs and services, at substantial density and over an extensive area. This conception for Shenzhen made it very distinct from the planning of neighbouring Hong Kong, where modifying significantly the topography of the inhabited city was never really contemplated, although reclamations have made up a significant amount of new development.
Shenzhen imagined the efficiencies of an uninterrupted city fabric that could be easily connected in a gridded infrastructure network but was difficult to achieve because of intervening hills. The decision to take down the problematic hills and to use the overburden for reclamation projects, particularly in the ports, thus enabled the city to achieve a single, integrated urban form from Luohu to Bao’an. This enabled the chequerboard system one can see today, now being underlaid with a metro system. The original idea involved the creation of substantial districts of several square kilometres of workplaces at close proximity to new residential districts with their own local services. In the low wage, large workforce communities of the 1980s, a lot of accommodation was required in close proximity to these production facilities. It made a system that was highly competitive in world markets. Shenzhen quickly monopolised the world production of sundry and domestic products, aided by the planning framework for living, production and shipping. But the economic foundation for this arrangement quickly shifted as new infrastructure made locations farther away more competitive than those in central Shenzhen. The workplaces shifted to new locales and the local industrial districts transformed into commercial, business and entertainment districts (Zacharias and Bliek, 2008).
These basic planning principles of green transportation corridors, an open landscape and functional organization into zones were applied in the 1996 Plan in various forms across the districts of Futian and Nanshan to the Pearl River estuary and constitute a consistent vision for how the urban fabric should function and what its major spatial characteristics would be (figure 4). That the ideas were largely functionalist in approach is supported in the outcomes, which can be clearly read in the documents, many of which can be found in translation. Formal concepts of built form across districts and spatial relationships of all kinds were largely lacking from the planning discussion, although came to be expressed in individual projects. The major characteristics include a standardized tower design in a standardized approach to layout, which although tending to a formal model, produced a monotonous skyline and a certain sameness to several districts. Late projects tend to emphasize certain visual and landscape qualities, drawing on historical references or semi-fictitious, Europeanized models in an effort to create distinction and confer certain values on the address. A concern with the emerging built form of Shenzhen can be read in recent planning documents of the Planning Bureau.
The major development projects of the 1990s and 2000s have been definable in geographic terms. The Futian development plan, which was always seen as a major open space with a prominent place for local government, came about with a number of additions and modifications. Cultural facilities and shopping were added and the green space was redefined. The symbolic reading of this CBD and city government centre is discussed extensively by Cartier (2002). The sharp change from the practically minded plans of the early years to the monumental properties and strong representational forms in the subsequent decade coincides with the city undertaking the building of major cultural and economic institutions including the exhibition center, library, opera, children’s palace and the government building itself. It is interesting that at the very time when questions were first asked about Shenzhen’s long-term character and purpose, that there was this strong move to create monumental buildings and spaces with representational forms. 
There are a number of notable innovations in district planning, including the so-called Overseas Chinese Town (OCT) and the sub-district of the Futian CBD designed by Skidmore, Owings and Merrill (SOM) of New York. The OCT plan is of green and traffic-calmed streets and pedestrian systems, with an emphasis on living habitats and shopping. It has come to symbolize a certain level of environmental quality that many in Shenzhen aspire to, but has overall lower density and no arterial roads on its own territory. The SOM-designed Futian project was a district of about 20 urban blocks drawn at North American dimensions, where moderately sized office towers of various contemporary styles, but looking vaguely like they came out of New York City, were combined with services at street level. Other efforts for urban design at the larger scale of the district are ongoing as the city tries to correct for a monotonous pattern of point towers of similar size and placement.
The road and block system of Futian is completely different from Luohu and was in some ways a harbinger for developments in new CBDs right across China. Urban blocks are relatively large in size, encompassing 20 h or more in area, divided by roads of 8 or more traffic lanes. The cité radieuse model is unmistakable although its reasons are not entirely what Le Corbusier had in mind. While functional separation characterises Futian, the layout also served the grand ambitions of the local administration to represent the city symbolically. Japanese and German architects provided the sketch plans for a grand spatial gesture that has quintessential Chinese properties. The perfect north-south orientation of the main axis, driving right through the centre of the government building is a direct reference to historic planning principles but incorporating an open space even larger than Tiananmen Square in Beijing. The statue of Deng Xiao Ping is also perfectly aligned on this axis from atop Lianhua mountain, now transformed into an urban park behind the government building.
The Futian CBD built out quickly, from its beginnings in the mid-1990s to its virtual completion in 2009. In all, it has an employment base of 250,000, along with housing, civic institutions, and shopping centres. Its rapid completion inspired a third axis for CBD development, from Nanshan district to Bao’an. The transportation system provides the structure for these axes, increasingly a bundle of road, rail and water-based means of transport. This new infrastructure is inspiring thoughts on the development of new nodes, particularly at locations in Nanshan District on Shenzhen Bay, on Dachan Bay and at Shekou, which can be read in the Planning Bureau draft plan to 2020 (figure 5). As the rail system, in particular, is consolidated, it is expected to contribute to revitalisation efforts and reconstruction in some cases. 
Planning in Shenzhen today is increasingly focussed on consolidation of the urban fabric, spatial integration of urban districts and a multi-layered development of infrastructure. The expansive developments of the 1980s have given way to smaller units, infill and redevelopment. The implementation of the metro system in particular, has generated new commercial and residential developments directly linked to the stations.
City planning policy favoured a dispersed commercial and service network of centres, again in contrast to the bi-polar system of Hong Kong. The dispersed network was intended to enhance local synergies and reduce travel in the extensive and elongated urban form of the city. These planning policies contrast with a market-led trend to re-invest in former industrial districts. As discussed separately in the section on urban villages, the eventual redevelopment of some of the already developed urban villages is likely to follow the pattern established in the industrial districts. More systematic approaches to development control are likely to emerge given the increasing atomisation of property rights and accumulation of built capital.
The desire to manage the growth and development of the two outlying districts of Shenzhen has not been matched with the powers. Significant local autonomy and multiple local players have produced multiple pockets of urban development, loosely connected with major roads. The greatest potential for urban development actually lies within those districts, although not ideally situated from the point of view of collective means of transport. Thus, the city of Shenzhen has been increasingly preoccupied with the integration of those districts into a coherent, overall development pattern. In part, such a move is a necessity if the SEZ is to preserve its pre-eminence in the larger urban context. But the necessary environmental qualities the SEZ must obtain could be threatened by uncontrolled development on its perimeter. The effort at integrating present and future developments throughout the perimeter areas of Shenzhen can be read in the figures from planning documents. Thus, the city has taken on, one might suggest by necessity, a polynucleated form, with a sustained reliance on road infrastructure in spite of major programmes to upgrade the rail infrastructure of the city. That dispersion of economic activity and populations has accentuated a clear hierarchy of property and income levels across the districts, with Futian and Nanshan at the top, followed by Luohu, then Longgang and Bao’an (figure 1). 
While a polynuclear form for Shenzhen was clearly not what the early planners had in mind it has become the preoccupation of the city today. In Shenzhen, this polynucleated structure is clearly the foundation for axes of development to the farthest reaches of regional infrastructure–the cities and outlying regions of Guangdong province and beyond. The challenge to integrate those more isolated urban environments into a viable, rail-based mass transit system is a particular challenge, that is first of all, a fiscal one. Because governmental attention nevertheless remains focussed on the central area, in terms of rail developments, it is likely that outlying areas will be more road-dominated than the central area. While the disparities between centre and periphery have always been strong in terms of income, in particular, they are likely to be accentuated. 
The central role of the high-value districts remains a feature of urban development in Shenzhen, reinforced most recently by the major expansion plan of the Shenzhen metro (figure 5). While the somewhat chaotic expansion of the urban edge in several directions has created imbalances at the regional level, the position of the SEZ and its central functions in Luohu, Futian, Nanshan and Bao’an seem assured. All land connections to Hong Kong pass through these centres, which also benefit from the early planning for an extensive urban core area housing more than seven million people. In the build-up of regional infrastructure that is ongoing, the SEZ enjoys a particularly privileged position.
The vision of Shenzhen as a vital link between neighbours can easily be read in recent planning documents, including the illustrations in this paper. As travel times are shortened and Shenzhen struggles to position itself as a command centre with international pretensions, new questions arise concerning the city’s role in the larger Pearl River Delta. Its frankly modernist stance, overlaid with a broad brush of grandiose spaces and oversized government structures has so far failed to congeal into a clear image. The departure of material production has left Shenzhen with command and control functions that compete with Guangzhou’s old and new CBD and perhaps even Dongguan’s CBD. New CBDs are being planned elsewhere in the PRD, all with similar ambitions and visual content. How should Shenzhen be read in the context of a multiplication of such office and commercial centres conceived and built almost simultaneously? 




After thirty years of development, urban regeneration is a major concern of the local government, with three main areas of intervention: The former expansive industrial zones have become available for alternate uses, as industrial uses transfer out of the SEZ. The lands that are presently available and are likely to become available are substantial in relation to the total developed urban fabric to date. They also offer an opportunity to attract development pressures to established areas. The regeneration of urban villages is continuing , mostly by incumbent upgrading and reconstruction, but also by transacting with local government or forming partnerships for the regeneration effort. The Shenzhen government has made the complete replacement of some centrally located villages, and their subsequent integration into a larger design strategy, a high priority. Rapid growth and rapid extension of the physical extent of the city has brought local disparities and the shift of business and commercial activities to newly developed areas, largely in the central and western parts of the SEZ. As a result, there is growing concern about how older areas built up in the 1980s can be regenerated without massive rebuilding. An examination of these efforts is worthwhile since they constitute part of the strategy of the local government to re-situate itself economically in the region. As will be seen, however, they do not yet constitute a coordinated strategy for the whole of the SEZ.

	6.1 Regenerating industrial estates 

The earliest official plans of Shenzhen were largely inspired by socialist planning principles; that is, heavy emphasis on areas of production, interspersed with affordable housing for workers, with services integrated within local areas. As already mentioned, this chequerboard pattern of land uses began to break down as industrial uses decamped to the suburbs, then to the outer districts and finally to urban centres inland. In 2009, it is estimated that fully one-third of all these industrial estates are vacant (Nanfangdushi, 2009). In their wake, they left districts in central locations that could be deployed for other purposes, along with a generally degraded housing stock. That housing stock increasingly accommodated service workers rather than industrial workers, who were now effectively delinked from the enterprises that fuelled the boom economy of the 1980s. The former industrial districts vary in area from about 50 ha to 100 ha, but have similar layout and transport characteristics. Laid out in relatively small blocks to facilitate truck access and accommodate standardized factory units, they were particularly suitable for redevelopment. Because the individual leased units were relatively small, their leases could more easily be turned over for new uses as the industries moved out. In general, fairly substantial compensation to residential users is required by Chinese law, but not to industrial users. The holders of the leases could easily convert factory floors to commercial uses without compensation to the original occupants, or could even proceed to redevelop the site to higher density and more lucrative use. The industrial estates are highly accessible, in keeping with the original idea that industrial users needed good access to transport facilities. Thus it was possible to proceed with redevelopment incrementally as sites became available.
A long-term strategy of the Shenzhen government to maintain the pre-eminence of the SEZ as the command centre of Shenzhen, notably by concentrating transport investments in this area, has delivered investments to these industrial estates. While technically such conversion from industrial use to commercial and residential use is illegal, or at the least should be accompanied by hefty surcharges, in practice the local districts turn a blind eye since it is entirely in their interests to promote their redevelopment. The first of these redevelopment zones, Huaqiangbei, is already in an advanced state, with much of the original building stock replaced with new structures and uses (Zacharias and Bliek, 2008).
The ultimate form of this redeployment of the former industrial districts is not completely clear at this point, in part because the dynamics of such redevelopment are beyond the reach of the planning and regulatory system. Leases for industrial purposes are nominally for twenty years, at which point the land and buildings revert to municipal control. But, as was seen in Huaqiangbei, the city has often opted not to take back the land but to allow conversion of the industrial uses to others. The conversion process has become very complex, involving detailed negotiations with the municipal authority. In any event, lease transfer virtually guarantees that such areas maintain the basic structure of blocks and streets. Larger assemblies of land  become virtually impossible without municipal intervention, thus perpetuating the form of the industrial estate, if not the buildings and spaces. This outcome has proved remarkably dynamic in its successive re-use and restructuring, that is primarily the result of a system. The large number of individually transacted units, in a framework that is at once highly accessible and highly democratic, has permitted rapid growth of markets and activity centres.
A multi-centre system of such commercial districts will emerge since the industrial districts themselves are disconnected from each other but constitute a substantial proportion of the land base. It seems likely, however, that a hierarchy of such centres will emerge since they are differentiated by urban transport initiatives of the Shenzhen government. The local management committees are intent on promoting the current set of economic functions, electronics and software in the case of Huaqiangbei, for example. But as the areas become more diversified with entertainment and shopping facilities, it seems probable that high-end housing and hotels will also be attracted to these areas, as is already happening.
New multiple-use buildings characterise the fabric of these areas, quite unlike the planned residential estates of the rest of the city or of Hong Kong, for that matter. Single buildings accommodate shops, offices, apartments and hotels as start-up businesses acquire small suites and use them as offices rather than as residential accommodation. Electronics-related businesses are engaged in product merchandising, wholesaling and development, such that propinquity is bound to be important. With approximately 200,000 jobs in this district alone, it is a clear example of industrial restructuring with important consequences for urban planning. The large numbers of people who descend on such an area on a daily basis for business, shopping and leisure have challenged the public transport system and forced some rethinking of railway infrastructure planning, in particular. Of course, the further development of the rail-based public transport system will favour the redevelopment of these former industrial districts.
The conversion of industrial lands is one of the strong suits of Shenzhen in the current market where innovation and speed are crucial to success. The original plans suit a conversion to alternate uses remarkably well, in providing excellent accessibility, and commercial units in modules from micro-scale efforts to whole buildings. In the competitive markets in which Shenzhen is competing, such areas provide the opportunity for entrepreneurship and innovation. They stand to become the new, multi-functional urban districts of the contemporary Chinese city, as they look for ways to build a creative economy.
Against the continued extension of farthest reaches of Shenzhen there is this intensified redevelopment of centrally placed urban land that is also relatively easy to convert to other uses. The contrast between these two forms of development across the territory of Shenzhen will become increasingly evident as such processes continue. That emerging spatial structure of major activity nodes connected with road and rail systems is nearly unique in China where, in spite of suburbanization, cities remain massively monocentric.
Although the self-regeneration of such industrial districts is one of the most hopeful signs on an increasingly clouded economic front, it is not without its problems. The sheer numbers of units undergoing functional change challenge the regulatory system. Already many of the original structures have undergone physical upgrading and change of use largely in the absence of governmental sanction. The large numbers of individually leased units makes the usual ‘planned unit’ form of control entirely obsolete. What is needed is a regulatory system that can handle a large number of individual changes without prescribing the rules site by site–zoning in other words. But in order to make this outcome a reality, there needs to be a vision of the future for the area. Of course, such rules require much more monitoring and codified procedures. Shenzhen, on the other hand, seems the most promising case for the introduction of such an approach and now has the administrative ability to do it.
In the meantime, much industrial land does not lie close to transport infrastructure, such that its conversion to new productive uses is much less likely, unless rescued by rail transit projects. Just what these vast estates will become remains a big question for Shenzhen. But the location of such estates within the SEZ makes it possible for the city to regenerate a vast territory to urban use. Given the relatively successful precedent of Huaqiangbei, it seems probable and even desirable that Shenzhen maintain its regeneration strategy, albeit with greater guidance on urban form. These areas will remain the most dynamic in economic terms and are best positioned to confront external pressures.

6.2 Regenerating urban villages	

	Urban villages are a constant presence in Shenzhen, a legacy of the farming and fishing communities that occupied the lowlands of Bao’an county, also the most buildable lands in the contemporary era (figure 6). Inspection of their distribution reveals the difficulty of their integration into a contemporary city as imagined by the modernist-leaning planners of Shenzhen. But the constitutional definitions of village land results in an even greater challenge to the planners. All privately held land in China is in two basic categories: lands in collective ownership by villages, defined as ancestral settlements largely devoted to primary production and occupied by ‘peasants’; and urban land in permanent government ownership. Since the land reforms of the late 1980s initiated in Shenzhen, urban land has been traded at market rates through emphyteotic leases with fixed terms generally not exceeding 70 years, granted by the government but often transferred to third parties. Villages, however, are not allowed to alienate their lands although they may negotiate transfer of ownership to the government. For the most part, however, villages are reluctant to engage in one-time transfers for lump sums of money, preferring sustained revenue. Collective ownership of village land and specific occupancy of a house plot made it easiest to divide the village land into regular building plots, each one operated by a resident family turned landlord. At least in the earliest phases of village regeneration, modest building capital allowed former farmers to rebuild simple homes as two- or three-storey multiple-flat blocks, and several more floors when revenue and housing demand made it possible. The dire need for affordable housing led these village developers to sacrifice accessibility, natural lighting and security in favour of maximizing the use value of the land. After several years of incremental increases in building height in the most advantageous village locations, the result was extremely high building coverage and relatively small, but regular building footprints. Blocks of flats were erected reaching 10 or 12 storeys, not served by elevators and often having just one stairwell. Streets were laid out for foot and two-wheeled transport within the village, but this street system was seldom well connected with the surrounding, planned road system. Most villages preserved their ancestral temples, along with a public open space that was usually located adjacent the temple (figure 8).
As the factory estates blanketed the planned industrial districts in the 1980s, the nearest villages became hot spots of intense urban development, usually preceding the planned urban development that eventually filled up the interstices between villages. In those early years, industrial productivity and GDP growth were the priorities, not the provision of worker housing. The urban villages have mostly already built up to high density, thus concentrating substantial investment on some 8 km2 of the SEZ, and 95 km2 in the entire city. The far greater extent of village land in the outlying districts was already largely built up before these districts were subsumed under the Shenzhen municipal administration. It is estimated that 7 million of Shenzhen’s total population of 14 million reside in urban villages, by far the highest proportion in Chinese cities of over one million population (Tong, 2009). When the local government became more interested in acquiring village lands, negotiated or compulsory purchase became extremely costly. Not only the farmers-turned-landlords needed to be compensated, but the numerous displaced residents as well. That fiscal challenge remains today and is, if anything, even more challenging than it was two decades ago. So far, the government has succeeded in acquiring only a tiny proportion of village land, usually located in strategic and visible locations, such as at the Luohu port of entry, and most recently opposite the government centre in Futian. For example, from 2004 to 2009, the municipal government spent 20 billion RMB ($3.3 billion US) to acquire 129 km2 of land, of which 50 km2 were free of encumbrance (personal communication). The replacement buildings in the acquired lands are at even higher density than the village-built housing blocks, so high that the replacement model is arguably infeasible for very extensive reproduction.
As elsewhere in China, Shenzhen began to exhibit spatial concentrations of low income and poverty (Liu and Wu, 2006). But unlike so many other cases, such spatial differentiation of incomes could not be so easily tied to the socialist housing initiatives of state-owned enterprises. Shenzhen, by definition, broke with that pattern of the all-inclusive housing estate conjoined with the centre of production. Nevertheless, a rapid and evident spatial differentiation by income began to operate in Shenzhen, outstripping the efforts of the local administration to minimise it. Unlike other cities in China, Shenzhen had no reservoir of Qing-era artisan housing, the modest brick buildings that concentrated populations cast off from failed state-owned enterprises, retirees without support and migrants in search of betterment. In Shenzhen, these prevalent country-wide phenomena were associated almost exclusively with the urban villages. Living conditions in the urban villages are generally poor when compared with the rest of Shenzhen (Wang et al, 2007). A high proportion of the total population live in a single, shared room. Some families also occupy a single room, often with shared facilities, poor ventilation and single stairwells serving several floors. However, in the low-wage service economy of the city, such accommodations are affordable, while the village itself provides the services to the local population. From the city government perspective, however, the village environments detract from the overall global city ambitions of Shenzhen. Moreover, villages have a reputation for harbouring proscribed activities and are viewed as a source of criminal elements. Shenzhen is known throughout China as the major city with the poorest record of public security, although the government regularly claims this is untrue. Whether such a blemish on the city image should be attributed solely to the urban villages is a matter for debate, but it is certain that that reputation hurts Shenzhen’s ambitions to achieve global status. As the economy shifts from production to information, services and consumption, it is the government’s hope that more of the migrant population lacking urban status will return to the rural environment. In addition, small, overcrowded units mean that the population density of urban villages is much higher than in the rest of the city. Although home to a historic community with its own traditions, temples and festivals, the vast majority of the population of such villages is composed of young, single people migrating temporarily from rural areas in search of economic opportunity. Although the hukou residential permit system has been largely relaxed and new labour laws legitimise the presence and contribution of the workers, the floating population remains unstable (Zhu, 2007). Most of the migrant population does not intend to settle down in the city and in any event, largely lacks the means to acquire property. Rapidly escalating property prices makes acquisition increasingly out of reach for this population. The problem of an unstable, ‘floating’ population is particularly acute in a city such as Shenzhen, which has no distinctive culture of its own, having attracted the young and ambitious from across China. Nor can such a population settle permanently in the urban villages, for the reasons mentioned at the outset. The best they can hope for is a rented flat with no hope of acquisition. If workers were allowed to acquire property within the villages, it is quite certain they would attempt to do so. 
A policy alternative suggested and tried is affordable housing for low-income people, particularly those displaced by the regeneration process. Projects have been undertaken but have met with significant problems. A recent case widely reported in the media concerned the largest social housing project, the Taoyuancun project, discovered to have serious quality problems. It was also found that some of the buyers were in fact rather well off. It was widely speculated that corruption at decision-making levels was almost certainly a reason for this failure, among others. Housing is particularly vulnerable to corrupt transaction, because it is also commodified and is a popular good.
Shenzhen exhibits, more than any other city in China, the contrast between a high wage population and a much poorer service and factory population, sharing the same geographical space. While the Gini coefficient in China, as a measure of income inequality in societies, is among the highest in the world, it is particularly high in Shenzhen because of the make-up of the population. Income disparity in Guangdong province as a whole is already higher than that for the country as a whole (Yao et al, 2004). Since it is widely thought that higher Gini is associated with crime, Shenzhen faces an image problem that is difficult to resolve in the short run.
	On the other hand, the villages can also be seen as a significant cultural asset for Shenzhen, itself in dire need of cultural credentials. Some villages have existed for centuries and house important temples, markets and open spaces. The lively street environment provides needed relief from the ordered but somewhat boring landscapes of planned Shenzhen. Redevelopment means reducing the stock of affordable housing. In the relatively high-wage economy of Shenzhen, reducing the supply of housing to the lowest income groups would mean that service workers would have to commute long hours from remote locations, a situation that already characterises Beijing. 
	What then are the future development scenarios for the urban villages of Shenzhen? In the earliest period of urban development, it was comparatively simpler and less costly to acquire village lands directly. In later times, the city carried out some redevelopment of some of the remaining urban village sites within the central parts of the SEZ. A highly visible village-initiated housing project at the Huanggang port of entry from Hong Kong was replaced with a high-end housing development. This project has been praised by government leaders, who note the improved physical environment of clean, paved surfaces and well-organized circulation on the ground. They also consider the rise in land value to be a good thing, without noting that the value increase is largely attributed to their own decision to increase the permitted density. Similarly, new projects lining the Binhai expressway were intended to screen the redeveloped village behind. A current project would involve the replacement of the Huanggang and Gangxia villages in Futian, which are highly visible from the government centre. In any event, it is highly unlikely these government initiatives will be generalised. Planners would likely argue against such concentrations of capital, if only for the highly contestable physical results of such concentrations of built capital (Harvey, 1975). The resulting buildings are bulky concentrations of building that are not sustainable across a larger territory because of the unacceptable environmental conditions that would result from such proliferation. It also seems doubtful, given the extremely high costs of the first few such developments, that redevelopment en masse of the villages can be contemplated. Yet, the municipal government would clearly like to undertake or see undertaken such redevelopment, and is redoubling its urban renewal effort.
	The main question with regard to the future of the urban villages is whether there will continue to be a low-wage, young working class that demands low-cost accommodation, and is willing to sacrifice environmental quality in the meantime. The decline in the factory population generally means less demand for this kind of housing and increasing potential that some village areas will be redeveloped to new design standards, for a different clientele. However, it is worth noting that an increasing proportion of this young worker population is employed in the rapidly expanding service sector. They might well prefer to remain in these advantageous locations close to the service jobs in the heart of the SEZ, rather than take up better quality housing far away.
	The village corporations themselves may find it in their interest to undertake improvement of their own village environments. The declining factory worker population is slowing such housing development and may soon generate high vacancy rates. At the same time, accelerating demand for centrally located space in the SEZ could generate a market-led urban renewal of some of these areas.
In spite of the efforts of the municipality to pave the way with pilot projects of its own, most of such redevelopment is likely to be market-driven. Although there are pockets of extreme density and poor environmental conditions, much of the housing stock is not all that bad. The buildings are in reinforced concrete and could be modified and improved without wholesale demolition. Many village streets are pleasant and lively walking environments reminiscent of Mediterranean towns of another era. Some villages have initiated home-based light industry, including Dafen village in Longgang District which specializes in reproduction and original painting. That village not only improved the buildings themselves, but invested in new public space of certain quality. In a transforming local economy, the building stock of the urban villages could represent a considerable asset, provided access was improved and basic services were provided. For the most part, such villages do not have adequate sewerage, contributing substantially to the abysmally poor conditions of all the water bodies within the city. Such redevelopment and revitalisation could be a considerable boost to Shenzhen as a whole if the redevelopment tends toward a mix of uses and a dynamic property market. But it is by no means a certainty. The relatively unsuccessful urban renovation generally in older areas of Hong Kong is a case in point at close range (Dimitriou and Cook, 1998). There, existing high densities make the costs of environmentally acceptable new development exceedingly high, a problem that is similar if not identical to that in Shenzhen.
	The dense pedestrian environment also offers, at least in the longer term, a huge clientele for its rapidly expanding metro system. There is virtually no space for parked cars in the villages, and no obvious way to provide parking in future. Paradoxically, the metro system itself has largely been designed to serve planned areas of the city, increasingly awash in private cars and car parking facilities. The city should make moves to increase accessibility from villages to the public transport system. But as mentioned above, the villages are largely disconnected from the urban fabric and typically far from existing or planned metro stations. The biggest encouragement for self-regeneration of the villages would surely be accessibility to the public transport system. 
Urban designers should find the improvement of the villages a most interesting and attractive task. The work would require quite a different approach than has been usual for the planning institutes of Shenzhen, who respond for the most part to government mandates for greenfield development. In the village environments, incremental change would have to be accompanied with design controls that would have to be negotiated with the primary stakeholders, the villages themselves. Such approaches are challenging but are near the cutting edge of planning anywhere in the world. Shenzhen could be a world leader in such negotiated regeneration. 

6.3 Regenerating 1980s habitats

	The developments of the 1980s were a reflection of needs and capacities of the time, but rapid growth of the GDP has resulted in spatial differentiation across the urban environment, with some earlier developments likely to decline in value. Most of these areas were developed in slab block estates and are generally well situated with regard to the transport network. The difficulty lies in the poor quality of some of the construction and generally poor finishes, a lack of variety in local activities and the difficulties in adapting such environments to contemporary living styles, including the keeping of a car.
	The mass transit system is expected to play a significant role in the self-regeneration of such districts but the outcomes remain somewhat uncertain. Similar efforts at urban regeneration in Hong Kong have not produced many examples of achievement. In part, the regeneration is costly for the anticipated benefits that can be derived on site, whatever the positive externalities for the city as a whole. There is no system for the integration of those downstream positive externalities into the costs associated with redevelopment. Thus, the mechanics of the revitalisation effort remain to be worked out.
	Shenzhen enjoys a significant advantage in maintaining relatively low densities in early developments in the first place. Low-rise buildings laid out rigidly in a plan is not one of the most difficult layouts to manage in a thorough redesign effort. The example of Huaqiangbei is instructive in this regard, as the early repetitive blocks and building forms were progressively replaced by a whole variety of different building forms. As suggested in the above, the problem is less one of urban form than it is one of developing the system for managing the redevelopment successfully on a social and economic level. It seems likely the tools for such regeneration will not be long in coming as the need becomes fairly acute. 
	In the meantime, greenfield development at the fringes of the ecological zones or actually within them is continuing at a far greater rate than regeneration of those built-up areas now 15 or 20 years old. From a certain perspective, bending to the insistent claims on the ecological zone fits with Shenzhen’s desire to show it has highly attractive housing adjacent the natural environment. That natural environment is being eroded at a worrisome rate, as noted elsewhere in this work. Regeneration of the 1980s areas is more difficult, but is a much more important task ahead for the government. 
Unlike the urban villages, these planned 1980s residential areas are in public ownership. The clock is nevertheless ticking on the leases, now reduced to fifty years or less. As long as there is uncertainty about the outcome at the termination of the lease, there is little incentive for incumbent re-investment. This, of course, is a China-wide problem. In the meantime, such areas enjoy relatively good locations and lower overall density than many new housing developments. Renewal of such areas, particularly when the buildings present some complex and comprehensive technical issues, seems likely only if the government engages in an incentive programme. Apart from the question of upgrading buildings, the improvement of public space, services and access to public transport also needs attention. But the planning system has not devolved planning responsibilities to the community level, which could assist in this effort.
The regeneration of early commercial areas or even ones created quite recently will also require attention in coming years. The emerging mass transit system will make it even easier to travel farther to new venues, leaving older ones to down markets or in abandonment. The government needs to review its policy for commercial space in light of its new public transport system plan. A large number of disconnected commercial venues are already experiencing winners and losers. Greater diversification of venues is needed, along with local design improvements to ensure a sustainable future for some of these centres. In other cities, the transport system itself has played a key role in restoring vitality to local commercial centres, although in Shenzhen the metro company in particular has not acquired this role. As a result, a very fine metro system is largely disconnected from the natural commercial services that normally connect with it. There are exceptions, of course, such as the MixCity commercial centre at the Grand Theatre metro station.
Finally, rising car ownership is generating more car-based trips for domestic purposes, due to a general absence of quality local services within communities. Efforts to reduce unnecessary car-based travel should include more local provisions within and between such estates, ideally close to transport nodes. Such transit-oriented development will require the restructuring and rebuilding of some local areas, if only to improve accessibility to the metro system.





As discussed in the previous sections on the series of plans, Shenzhen relied heavily on the development of infrastructure for its growth. The development of arterial roads, expressways, ports, airports and metro lines have greatly increased the capacity and efficiency of urban movement. Previous experience and the thrust of the latest plans make clear that large infrastructure will continue to play a powerful role in shaping and organising space.
Shenzhen may be the best case in China for examining how a new city builds its efficiency on wheels. Without the support of a complete highway system, the ‘clustered linear’ and later ‘network’ models for development would not have been realisable. The Guangzhou-Shenzhen expressway played an irreplaceable role in the city’s developing export-oriented manufacturing activity, contributing significantly to economic integration in the region. The three east-west highways–Shennan avenue, Beihuan road and Binhe/Binhai road, complement each other and satisfied the dramatically increased traffic demand generated by the rapid simultaneous urbanisation of several urban clusters. Certain other highways, such as the Meilin-Guanlan expressway and the Yantian-Baguang expressway, facilitate the connection between the ‘metropolitan cluster’ and outlying areas, as well as help realise the implementation of the various development axes proposed in the comprehensive plan and development strategy.
Nevertheless, car ownership is rapidly outstripping the provision of road infrastructure (figure 7). While a casual critic might be tempted to suggest that Shenzhen brought the crisis upon itself, by promoting automobile use over public transport, this issue, like so many other planning matters in a fast-developing city, is complex.
	While it is certainly true that Shenzhen privileged the use of the private automobile over public transportation from the beginning, it could be argued that it had little choice at the time. In neighbouring Hong Kong, land supply was rigidly controlled and infrastructure costs minimised (Bristow, 1989). A sophisticated development system with abundant financial resources was already in place when the new towns were planned in the New Territories, serviced essentially by the Kowloon-Canton Railway (KCR). Until the development of the new towns in the New Territories, Hong Kong had built at the highest urban densities in the world. The effort to decant those high urban densities starting in the 1960s could be managed with the substantial resources already in hand. In Shenzhen, the imperative to grow quickly faced a number of obstacles: Firstly, there was no indigenous development industry of the scale and financial clout of that in Hong Kong. Secondly, the emphasis on production campuses with neighbouring worker housing obviated the necessity of a comprehensive public transport system. Finally, modes of production had already changed from the small-unit, high-rise model of Hong Kong to more extensive assembly-line production that required lower densities and more extensive floor areas. In hindsight and with adequate resources, Shenzhen might well have promoted a public transport system over a road-based one but hardly had the resources to undertake the kind of development that was possible in neighbouring Hong Kong.
	Shenzhen opted for the more conventional road-based transport system with large-block development, largely in keeping with practice throughout China at the time. In this way, access was facilitated simultaneously to a large number of blocks and development sites. The remarkable growth rates discussed earlier in this article are proof that the model worked almost too well. The multiple-laned roads were largely used for industrial transport, buses and bicycles. Like other cities throughout China in the 1980s, Shenzhen planned bicycle lanes on all roads. The bicycle share was substantial well into the 1990s, at 12% of modal share of trips over 500 m at the close of the decade.
	The rapid growth of the economy also led to growing private car ownership. Unlike Shanghai, Shenzhen did not impose restrictions on private car ownership. Also, China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 brought radical price reductions in cars, and the incursion of more foreign car manufacturers, such that the fleet grew at an astonishing rate. With 0.7 m cars in 1999, it was expected to have 1.6 m in 2010, but the figure is more likely to be 2 m (Shenzhen, 2005). Traffic speed declined accordingly, from an average of 20 k/h in 1999, to 18 in 2002 and 16 in 2003.
	The city has invested heavily in car infrastructure at new commercial sites and in access to them. Much new development outside the SEZ offers substantial savings on housing, which must then be invested in personal transport, to make the housing accessible to employment centres. Much of the employment of concern to this middle-income urban population is centred within the SEZ and specifically in the concentrations of office centres of Louhu, Futian and Nanshan. But access by public transport between employment and the burgeoning residential enclaves behind the hills beyond the SEZ remains fractured and indirect. The contrasts between centre and periphery will continue to grow as a consequence. The city centre will be increasingly well served by underground rail and reserved bus lanes on the surface along with substantial space given over to pedestrian movement.




	Shenzhen’s port development can be traced back to the first days of economic reform in the late 1970s. Export-oriented manufacturing generated huge demand for sea transportation, which stimulated port construction and port-related industrial development. Nanshan district, where Shekou container terminal and Mawan/Chiwan container ports are located, is the special focus of most significant port development while Qianhai, referring to the bay area between Bao’an and Nanshan districts, is attracting the most recent port development. The ports not only attracted investment for building infrastructure and utility, but also introduced new concepts such as private-public partnerships and joint ventures. With Shenzhen’s emphasis on port development, there is a clear intention of having coastal areas bear as much as possible of new development. Of critical importance to the ports  is industrial transport. Mired in the growing gridlock of urban Shenzhen, it was necessary to think how to facilitate goods movement in the context of such liberalisation of travel. Moving container trucks at night was one change that kept the goods moving. Tolls on the Guangshen expressway from Dongguan and Guangzhou helped reduce individual car users of this major corridor, but the effect was somewhat transitory and insufficient in effect. Recent planning focusses on inter-city, intra-regional and international facilities, including large-scale expansion of the airport, the Dachan and Yantian ports and facilities to connect them regionally (figure 5).
Rising congestion on this system designed for the economic functioning of the Pearl River Delta, came to suffer serious diseconomies with lengthening journeys and unpredictable scheduling, leading to more highway projects, such as the Yangjiang elevated toll highway along the Pearl River coastline to the Dachan port and the Shenzhen Bay bridge to Hong Kong (figure 1). This highway is intended to provide additional capacity, in particular for container vehicles heading to the Dachan port or, via the new customs facility in Nanshan, to Hong Kong. With attention increasingly focussed on Shenzhen’s ports as one of its prime economic motors in the coming years, such transportation initiatives were seen as a necessity, albeit an environmentally troubling one.
	The Yangjiang highway parallels the sensitive ecosystem of the Pearl River estuary, with its mangroves, fishing ports and oysteries. In an effort to minimize the impact, it is being built as an elevated structure so that access may be maintained to the waterfront. But this new system radically alters the conditions in which a number of other plans are being realized. Of particular note is the Bao’an city centre, which was conceived around a bay that was a long-time fishing port and river estuary. The Bao’an CBD is on ‘land’ created through sea reclamation, on territory that was essentially already in the hands of the government. This particular sea had been part of the larger mangrove forest that continued up the coast of the Pearl River. The plan itself is a grand gesture beginning with the engineered curve of the bay, and a street system radiating with perfect geometry from a point in the middle of the bay. As with much of the rest of Shenzhen, the plan is a radical transformation of the existing landscape, where all previous landmarks have been erased. Such a major district plan is not immune to influences coming from other quarters that were not necessarily factored into the local plan. Such as the case of Bao’an.
The coastal road in this case will serve a double function in providing a route along the water, but also tied into the urban fabric of Bao’an, serving as a supplementary carrier to the national highway and the Guangzhen expressway. In general, the approach of the transport planners in Shenzhen has been to supply road to the growing car fleet, although such supply-oriented approaches will have their limits. Already, questions have arisen about some of the new highway projects promoted because of their obvious negative impacts on environmental quality. The new industrial highway cuts across the bay, altering its character completely and diminishing the value of this new, public-oriented waterfront. Thus the main view from the promenade waterfront will be of two bridges that fill the view and emit noise and dust. But just beyond the bridges is the fast-expanding Dachan port facility, with its superior docking facilities, needing better access from the manufacturing hinterland to the north, which the Yangjiang highway provides. Resolution of these planning contradictions is difficult, when the projects are occurring simultaneously and have their logics and imperatives. But the precise placement of vital infrastructure is often not known until quite late in the process, while other plans, based on entirely different assumptions, are proceeding apace. In addition to this problem of plan coordination, there is the sense that the city is still actively trying to reshape itself on the ground. The plan is not a finality. To some extent, the activity structure of the city remains in flux with multiple and sometimes competing projects. The Bao’an plan has competitors in Nanshan and Shekou whose precise outcomes are not yet known. There will be competing arguments for favouring one or the other, with infrastructure having an important structuring effect on the whole.	
	Although the transportation system of the whole of Shenzhen favours a network of interconnected highways, the system is nearly built out with little opportunity for further expansion. The highly congested central corridor through the SEZ is the focus of various studies to manage and restrain further growth in automobile traffic, for example through the use of congestion tolls. In the ongoing economic restructuring, this central corridor has an important, even preponderant role and thus has received more attention than the rest of the city. It is also recognized that a high proportion of air-borne pollutants are generated from car traffic within this corridor (Chang and Yao, 2008). Air-borne pollutants are trapped in the urbanized lowlands between the hills and further concentrated by building forests of high-rise buildings. The competitive advantages of the region are being undermined by this worsening environmental picture, but is also raising alarm bells regionally as the health effects are considered (Loh et al, 2008). The development of the rail system is viewed hopefully as one of the ways out of the transport crisis.

Metro and regional rail	

The latter 1990s were marked by ‘metro fever’, when many cities turned to plans of building urban metro systems in China. Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chongqing, Wuhan, Tianjin and Beijing were all busy hatching ambitious expansion plans for urban metro. Shenzhen’s own plan was approved in 1998, with the first phase of construction complete and open in December, 2004. Perhaps as a product of that feverish period of planning, the Shenzhen metro has been unsuccessful in terms of linking with existing and ongoing urban development. Such a result has been blamed on a lack of sufficient urban planning in the earlier stages of planning and design (Gu, 2009). In the latest metro development projects–phases 2 and 3–urban planners are able to play a more important role by providing professional and technical support for efficiency, linkage with land use and overall rational growth. The metro development plan is now seen as a key element in implementing the network or polycentric development plan of the latest comprehensive plan. Four additional lines are currently under construction to supplement the existing two lines, partly in response to the central government’s call for cities to speed up their infrastructure projects. A regional commuter rail system supplements the core metro system with intentions to link the SEZ with Bao’an and Longgang and eventually Dongguan and other cities in the PRD (figure 5). The current metro development plan favours the central SEZ areas, where it is expected to alter the modal split, certainly to a greater extent than will be possible in the outlying Bao’an and Longgang development areas. The intensive development of rail in the SEZ corridor may allow the development of non-motorised transport, which is at present a somewhat distant dream. But if Huaqiangbei is taken as a harbinger, pedestrianism is likely to dominate in certain local areas, with the major road system continuing to function as at present. It is forseeable that those local areas undergoing redevelopment will be dominated by non-motorised transport. The further development of the metro system is likely to promote intensive nodal development at certain key locations, as noted above.
Plans to vastly expand the metro system came after the plans for the initial two lines were hatched. These new lines converge in a central space at the heart of the SEZ, which is relatively small. As a result, the density of metro lines within this central space is exceedingly high. The addition of lines within this central space required new alignments given the difficulty, if not impossibility, of building additional lines on existing alignments. New lines will be connected together with underground passageways with commercial services in an effort to improve connectivity and resolve the problems of street-level movement. These lines also connect with the proposed high-speed rail system, serving the Futian and Shenzhen North railway stations. As with high-speed rail in Europe, such hubs offer the possibility of direct connections between high-speed rail, local metro and the airport. It seems likely that this high concentration of public transport infrastructure in Shenzhen’s central space will attract further investment in buildings and uses.




	Shenzhen airport, Bao’an International Airport, is located at the geographical centre of the Pearl River Delta region. This locational advantage has enabled Shenzhen airport to serve as a regional airways hub, rather than a city airport. This regional function may explain why the airport could grow so rapidly in terms of both passenger and cargo handling (SMG, 2004b). In the longer term, the two airports of Hong Kong and Shenzhen are seen by Shenzhen as partners, in the development of an integrated regional transportation gateway. In 2007, a joint task force for the cooperation of Hong Kong and Shenzhen was established, which later facilitated an agreement among the respective governments and airport authorities.
Further development of the two airports will bring related development to Shenzhen’s west coast, along the Pearl river estuary. The airport has undergone successive expansion plans since its opening in 1991. In 2007, it was handling 20 m passengers, doubling the volume of 2003 (Shenzhen Government, 2007). Soon to be connected by metro to the rest of the SEZ, the airport enjoys a favourable location with respect to the SEZ, with good road and rail access. It is also a low-cost location when compared with Hong Kong, such that it can attract a high volume of internal air traffic with passengers bound for international locations via Hong Kong. The transiting facilities, including a ferry link between the airports, has reinforced the connection between the airports, which is surely a benefit for both. Shenzhen’s airport is now the fourth busiest in terms of passenger volume in China, competing notably with Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport, second in China and soon only one hour away from Shenzhen. The longer term future of the five major airports, including Zhuhai and Macao, is not completely clear although examples of synergy are emerging. In the meantime, all the airports are looking to expand their ancillary activities, including shopping, dining and personal services, making those facilities a destination in their own right. Shenzhen plans an ‘airport city’ housing such facilities and in the hopes of eventually transforming this transportation hub into an important urban node.
	Much importance is being given to the major transport corridors being developed along the highway network and railway network. The closer connections between Hong Kong, Shenzhen, Dongguan, Guangzhou and Huizhou resemble those developed previously in the Rhine-Ruhr area of Germany and the Netherlands.  In those regions, it is found that the movement of people between places are a major contributor to the vitality of the individual centres (Zandvliet et al., 2008). Shenzhen may be strategically situated with regard to its neighbours and the national networks, but its relation to the west side of the Pearl River Delta remains undefined. At present, it is Guangzhou that is the main urban centre for the Zhongshan and Zhuhai, but Shenzhen would like to establish more direct links with the western part of the PRD, to strengthen its own key location with regard to these other areas of the province that are likely to receive major infrastructure investment in the next years. To this end, they propose a new bridge crossing of the Pearl River Estuary, that would be one of the longest spans of its kind in the world.

8. A rail-based future but a car-dominated present

Rapid urbanisation and growth were facilitated by infrastructure built at ‘Shenzhen speed’ as it is known throughout China. Rapid and distributed development was facilitated by road systems, which could be built at relatively low cost while at the same time covering significant territory. It is also often heard that a city’s overall efficiency will be enhanced with a well-functioning transport system for motor vehicles, with the implication that rail-based systems will be insufficient or inappropriate for some significant proportion of the total travel demand. Over Shenzhen’s history, the emphasis on traffic corridors, supported by their massive infrastructure, have been pointedly designed with the intention to facilitate the movement of cars and, at least in the first decades, to maximise their use. In the early years, poor bus service competed with the bicycle, while the vehicle fleet was dominated by taxis. Today an increasing proportion of the vehicular fleet is private vehicles that now dominate the road environment and drive the design and access characteristics of many new urban developments. 
Shenzhen was laid out in major functional blocks linked with wide roads. As such, travel by any other means than a car necessitates long trajectories along roads that have no supporting commercial infrastructure. Walking between commercial centres involves circuitous paths under bridges and on overpasses. The middle class balks at walking as a result, resorting to taxis if not their own car even for trips of one kilometre. Since 1999, the bicycle has been virtually banned on the roads and is completely impacticable on sidewalks, where it is nevertheless tolerated. It was never thought such non-motorised transport would be necessary since local areas would have their own commercial centres and a public transit system would supply any other needs. But this vision was soon to be rendered obsolete by rising mobility and the specialisation of activity centres. People are living farther and farther from their work and have leisure destinations of their choice, sometimes a considerable distance from home. The drive to own and operate a car has been in part a consequence of the urban plan, which makes it difficult to get around without one.
	The car fleet in Shenzhen has grown more rapidly than in most large cities on the eastern seaboard of China, such that it now has the second largest fleet of privately owned automobiles of all Chinese cities (figure 7). The fleet has grown more rapidly than the population since the central government launched its policy to promote the car industry in 1994. The rate of private car ownership is approximately 107 vehicles per thousand population, or about one-seventh the comparable rate in the United States. The question for Shenzhen planners is how this car fleet might grow and the implications such growth would have for infrastructure. The underlying reasons for household car acquisition remain an open debate with household income and urban density figuring prominently in the discussion (Sanghi, 2005). GDP alone would appear to be an unreliable indicator of car ownership rates (World Bank, 2002).
A car-oriented lifestyle characterises much of middle-class Shenzhen, even if urban densities are relatively high. Overall, as suggested by the World Bank survey cited above, urban density is negatively correlated with car ownership and use. In Shenzhen, housing estates built in the 1980s and 1990s, largely without underground parking, are awash in parked vehicles. The supply-minded municipal government might very well decide to tackle the problem with more parking facilities as it is already doing at new commercial centres and for new office buildings, but such supply-oriented policy will come at substantial material and environmental costs. 
In the meantime, the metro system (MTR) is under rapid development and offers some hope of escape from life lived in a car. The system under development will greatly enhance the accessibility to mass rapid transit over a large part of the SEZ. The original plan favoured a limited metro network with feeder bus lines, while the updated proposal sees a high density of parallel and intersecting lines over the SEZ. So far, patronage levels on the two-line system are disappointingly low, with only a half-dozen stations handling expected numbers of riders. One of the problems is that a metro system is somewhat ill-adapted to the layout of Shenzhen, with some stations quite isolated from any supporting urban environment. The city is a chequerboard of dense urban districts interspersed with open spaces and urban villages, with many stations located within low density districts or on major roads. A denser network of lines may well improve metro patronage, as connectivity is improved and walking distance to the stations is reduced, at least within the SEZ. Some new interchange stations are located in the midst of built-up areas, while others may spur redevelopment. The city will have to consider how to enhance walkability in the areas around the stations in a bid to raise metro patronage but also to satisfy a growing demand for improved transport services. Finally, the MTR is being linked to a developing regional rail system. The original two-line system was connected at one end at Luohu with the KCR to Hong Kong, but has been supplemented with a second link in Futian. A new rapid rail line between Guangzhou and Shenzhen is under development and will connect with the MTR. The rising numbers of rail commuters between Guangzhou, Dongguan and Shenzhen will find it possible to transfer directly to the MTR. A public transport future may well be possible in Shenzhen, but questions remain about how the local environment can support it. The local government is obsessed with infrastructure projects, but pays little attention to how infrastructure supports a comprehensive system of activities and movement. In part, this is a consequence of the emphasis on short-range results. In the final analysis, however, the move to mass rapid transit in Shenzhen is a hopeful one.
Shenzhen has organised its rail-based transport future with a hierarchy of interchange stations. In the urban plan to 2020, six major interchange stations are proposed, only one of which, Luohu, is actually complete at present. These stations (figure 5) are consistent with the urban design plan (figure 9). The stations combine national high-speed rail lines, regional rail services and metro lines. They are seen as growth pôles in their own right–the airport and Qianhai cases being the clearest ones–but also as ways of securing Shenzhen’s role in emerging economic relations with a constellation of cities throughout Guangdong province. In detail, the six hubs can be described as fulfilling the following functions:
1–Futian hub is intended for high-end business and regional people flows. The following rail infrastructure will be collected and interconnected here: one national high-speed railway (Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail), one regional railway (Guangzhou-Dongguan-Shenzhen Inter-city rail), four inner-city metro lines
2–Luohu is the oldest transportation hub linked to Hong Kong and also provides inter-city service to Guangzhou. The infrastructure consists of inter-city rail service with Guangzhou, Shenzhen railway station, the busiest crossing to Hong Kong.
3–Qianhai is planned to host a new CBD and to combine sea transport, cross-boundary railway service, expressway and three metro lines.
4–Longhua is the new Shenzhen railway station, with the largest capacity for passenger and freight traffic of all stations in Shenzhen. It is designed to serve as a complex transhipment point, with both long-distance passenger and cargo transportation activities.
5–Airport hub is planned to be served by metro and regional rail to connect with nearby Qianhai CBD, and is also connected to Hong Kong airport directly with a fast ferry. Its favourable location in the emerging rail network is expected to give it a regional role in air travel.
6–Universiade is the location hosting the 2011 Universiade. Long term plans see the hub with crossing regional rail lines, with significant new development taking advantage of location and facilities.
Shenzhen is still a car-oriented city over an extensive and dispersed territory. The 1990s explosion in metro development allowed Shenzhen to launch an ambitious plan for metro development. To a certain extent, Shenzhen has little choice but to develop its rail infrastructure as a way of alleviating pressure on the roads. It remains for Shenzhen to give priority to public transport in the larger environment, however, even while it builds metro at a feverish pace.
	
9. The environmental challenge

The economic shift from production and distribution to services is usually accompanied by rising demand for a better environment. In Shenzhen, as in other large cities along the eastern seaboard, industries have decamped the cities to establish in districts inland or even in inland provinces. The improvements in air quality and noise that could have been expected from their departure has largely been wiped out by the rise in domestic source pollution in large cities (Loh et al, 2008). But as cities position themselves to operate as command and information centres, they must improve their physical environment so as to retain these new economic players.
	In the increasingly competitive system of cities in China, the poor air and water quality of Shenzhen is a serious disadvantage, particularly as the economy shifts to tertiary activity. Information industries are highly mobile and also need to provide a good environment to highly skilled employees. Shenzhen, like Hong Kong, faces a serious challenge to its competitivity on the grounds of environmental quality. In spite of a massive, recent commitment to public transportation, the city remains car-oriented, with the second largest fleet of private cars in the country. Managing the demand for car use is one of the most important objectives Shenzhen has set itself over the next several years (Shenzhen, 2007; Shenzhen, 2005). But that environmental goal is circumscribed by continuing support for private automobile acquisition and the provision of facilities for car use. Car use alone is estimated to account for more than half of the air-borne pollutants within the SEZ area today, with the total number of privately owned automobiles now approaching 1.5 m. As a result, there is no single policy framework that represents an attempt at managing all aspects of the private car fleet. While that effort has been considerable in the case of Hong Kong, and resulted in ever-increasing share of travel by public means in that city, they are also confronted with increasing numbers of cars on the roads. The problem is universal, although it plays out quite differently even in two cities close together.
	Those same hills that exacerbate air quality are Shenzhen’s most important natural asset. The short and recent development history left the hills largely intact, a significant resource in the long run. They are an important advantage for Shenzhen that cities such as Shanghai, Guangzhou, Beijing or Tianjin do not have. The connected system of green areas spans the north side of Shenzhen, leaving the southern and generally flatter territory to urbanization. The early strategy to cut a swath of developable land north of the Shenzhen River, criticized at the time as disrespectful of the natural landscape, had the significant merit of concentrating development in a relatively compact arrangement well clear of the hills. Had later-built roads steered clear of the hills, the clear demarcation between city and nature might have been preserved, but transport imperatives called for road linkages across the green zone (figure 1). Development followed in Bao’an and Longgang, where district governments and former villages seized the opportunity to urbanize land close to the roads. The consequence has been a steady and rapid erosion of the green resource, to the point where it risks becoming a string of green enclaves bound by continuous urban fabric (figure 10).
	There are also problems with the definition of the ‘ecological zone’ that has led to numerous abuses. For example, golf courses are technically ‘green’ areas although notoriously destructive of biological systems. The Mission Hills golf course, with world-class pretensions, is located squarely within the ecological zone. Marble-lined mansions selling for $15 m US are nestled in private gardens between the links. The golf course itself is technically permissible within the ‘ecological protection zone’, on the premise that such facilities are managed green spaces. However, securing a world-class golf course entails allowing ancillary facilities that must be housed in substantial buildings. With the completion of the course and the mansions, proposals for hotels and apartment complexes quickly followed, virtually urbanising former parkland. The desire to give Shenzhen citizens access to nature led to the development of Interlaken, after its Swiss namesake. A managed parkland with indigenous flora and circuits for visitors has been supplemented with a pastiche Swiss village, miniature railway, cable car ride, spas, restaurants, a four-star resort, and finally, more expensive villas. This emerging full-blown resort is deep within the ecological zone and adjacent one of Shenzhen’s largest domestic water reservoirs. These two cases, among others, illustrate the difficulty in attempting to maintain a ban on urban development within the ecological zone. As the land resource has been exhausted and citizens clamour for access to the natural environment, incursions are occurring at increasing frequency. 
	Shenzhen is not alone in failing to fully protect a government-designated greenbelt. In the case of Shenzhen, public desire for access to the natural resource has brought demands for support infrastructure, which then opened the door to private incursions. The Shenzhen case illustrates in particular the difficulty of defining permissible land uses in a natural environment hosting mass tourism. The alternative to this difficult management problem, it might be suggested, is designation of the entire ecological zone as urban park, without any commercialisation.
Shenzhen’s northern neighbour, Dongguan, has been even less successful in preserving its ecological zone. Its largest reservoir, set in a natural watershed above the sprawling city, has succumbed to resort development, a research park and more housing. As this reservoir, among others, are closed as water sources and opened to urban development, Shenzhen faces a growing water shortage. Shenzhen, like Hong Kong, has relied on its neighbours for water supply and has been willing to pay the price. But the high value of urban development cannot compete with domestic water production, and are under no obligation to do so for its neighbours. While it could be argued that both Shenzhen and Hong Kong have not done enough to supply themselves with water from their own sources, particularly given the abundant annual rainfall and the relative ease of water retention in this hilly environment, it is unlikely a combined population of nearly 20 million could be supplied with water from their own land base. Clearly, the problem will get worse before it gets better. The extended drought in 2009 in Guangdong province brought the problem to public attention, as rationing became a real possibility. In the meantime, it is likely that Shenzhen will have to look ever further afield for sources of fresh water, that might take the form of extensive pipeline networks to the northern reaches of Guangdong province in the first instance. Water retention systems could be retrofitted in the city, following some early patterns of water distribution. 
	Foresight and the succession of urban plans did produce a network of major urban parks that no other Chinese city can claim. Major parks and green spaces of 50 hectares or more are found throughout the city. In addition, major roads are lined with green space, adding to the impression of verdant spaciousness, at least from the perspective of a moving car. Although the urban plans saw these urban parks as a local resource, accessible to the urban habitats that surround them on all sides, it has been suggested that they could eventually form part of a linked network of green spaces spanning from the water to the hills. While the overdesigned roads are devoted massively to motor traffic today, they offer the potential for good walking and cycling facilities that lead directly to green spaces. The ban on strip commercial uses along these major roads will make their conversion to non-motorised travel much easier.
	The waterfronts have not fared so well. The vast mangroves have been reduced to a preserved remnant on the heavily polluted Shenzhen Bay and have ceded to container ports on the Yantian waterfront. The Pearl River waterfront remains relatively intact, but is currently being eyed for expanded port facilities, new road infrastructure and industrial landfills. As Shenzhen’s economic future is increasingly tied to the health of its port functions, attempts to reserve waterfront for ecological purposes, recreational and cultural use have proved challenging. This is not to suggest that the local government turns a blind eye to such issues and has called for serious reflexion on the future of its waterfront resource. Indeed, the authors of this article were asked in 2007 to reflect on the long-term future of Shenzhen’s waterfront in the context of a plethora of development plans. 
	Yangjiang highway can be mentioned again in this context. Its design as an elevated structure across the mangroves of the higher reaches of the Pearl River in Shenzhen was intended to preserve the aquatic environment and keep options open for further development on this waterfront. It is being built at substantially higher cost in order to deal with the environmental costs of such infrastructure. The plan recognises that building a major highway at ground level along the waterfront is not a solution that is considered viable today, particularly in light of the demolition of several such highways worldwide.
	Finally, the case of Yantian deserves mention. This district was historically cut off from the highly developed western parts of Shenzhen by mountainous terrain, leading to different and more modest development. The major container port here was accessible via a private tunnel where a toll was applied. The public access road followed the contours of the mountain range, making the journey to this district long and somewhat hazardous. Yantian represents a significant ecological and recreational asset for Shenzhen, albeit a somewhat inaccessible one. If Shenzhen should make this recreational and ecological environment more accessible, it might well lead to urban development and destruction of the resource. Keeping it isolated preserves it, but also makes it a distant dream for most Shenzhen citizens who might like to escape city for the day. The city has recently opened a twinned public highway to Yantian that parallels the private route. Built at enormous cost, this new highway required 5 tunnels to reach the Yantian shore. Already new developments are springing up near the mouth of this new access. At present, the planning system is incapable of exerting sufficient control to prevent undesired development of the natural resource once the infrastructure is in place. Even in Hong Kong, such unplanned development has occurred, although to a lesser degree than might be expected in Shenzhen. It is yet another difficult planning puzzle for Shenzhen.
In spite of growing awareness that the competitive strength of Shenzhen depends to an increasing degree on the environmental conditions it is able to offer as a place to live and to work, the city continues to champion evident economic benefits. That these benefits are often short-run is a well-known problem of government policy in China. The necessary communications between parties and interests in the emerging economic environment of south China seems to be leading the increasing numbers of joint commissions with sweeping mandates. It seems likely that the necessary communications between specialities is more likely to produce coherent results. The competitive position of Shenzhen depends to some extent on its ability to adapt to the current rapid change in its own economic profile.
	There is a strong latent desire for environmental improvements at the local level in Shenzhen. Improving pedestrian safety remains a difficult problem to solve in the short run. The rapid rise in the number of cars and especially new drivers makes it difficult to develop an ethos of road behaviour that characterises many developed cities. The city continues to implement measures intended to improve pedestrian safety but safety will remain a challenge for years to come. Recommendations coming from various sources tend to suggest local management plans that would control access to certain areas, while seeking greater efficiencies in the larger network. Shenzhen has precedents in the Dongmen pedestrian zone, OCT and Huaqiangbei that provide ready evidence for the approach.   
	In the absence of public participation, sponsored debate within the local government on major policy issues sometimes reflects an unease with the unitary policy stances characteristic of local governments in China. It is clear that the long-term future of the city, even its economic future, depends on the preservation and enhancement of its environmental assets. But short-term economic ends can sometimes sound more convincing, if only because the consequences are more immediate. That tension between short-term economic benefit and long-term environmental gains exists elsewhere. The scale at which such policy questions are being played out makes international cases appear tiny, if not trifling when compared with the areas under question in Shenzhen. The whole of Bao’an district undergoing growth and restructuring, including the highway just mentioned, is 760 km2 in area. Environmental policies to manage such a large landscape, while taking account of many simultaneous projects is a central issue for the local government.
	The gradual move away from planned unit development (PUD) to regulatory approaches was inevitable given that nearly all land in Shenzhen that could be leased is now in private hands, if not actually developed. The real prospect of redevelopment of whole areas of the city that were developed in the 1980s, as discussed earlier in this article, has necessitated a shift to rule-based regulation of development. The opportunity thus presents itself to manage development as part of the daily operations of government, in a similar way to cities outside China. A new agency of the Urban Planning Bureau, the Shenzhen Urban Planning and Research Center is specifically charged with this task. The potential to integrate environmental standards within the planning control system is there.


10. Conclusion: Looking ahead to 2020 in Shenzhen

Predicting the future is always a perilous venture, perhaps especially in China which remains in the throes of massive, nationwide restructuring of its urban system and the national infrastructure that draws that system together. In the city’s first comprehensive plan in 1986, planners set the ambitious goal of growing from a fishing village to a city over one million population in fifteen years. The target was so aggressive, it attracted doubts and attacks (Zhao, 2004). However, it took less than five years to achieve this goal, with the population reaching 2 m in 1990, almost double the original prediction. As noted throughout this paper, a succession of challenges since 1986 has weakened the credibility of planning to predict the future, but at the same time has strengthened the planning role in achieving specific targets.A series of local planning documents aim at targets nominally linked to 2020 or even beyond. The planning documents are essentially of three kinds, following the major discussions in this paper: Shenzhen’s status on the world stage, Shenzhen’s relationship with its regional partners, and efforts at internal restructuring. This conclusion takes up these topics in this order.
Joining the exclusive club of global cities, although a desire articulated by Shenzhen’s leadership in recent years, is clearly impossible in this time frame, and perhaps in the very long run as well (Sassen, 2001). The challenges to this ambition are overwhelming: the productive side of the city’s economy is largely run from Hong Kong; the financial system is tiny in comparison with its neighbours; it has few corporate headquarters of any significance; the tiny international community lives at the fringes of the city, a boat-ride away from Central Waterfront in Hong Kong; the city lacks the distinctive character of a London, New York, Tokyo or Paris. Aspirations to some international stature are perhaps reasonable, however, given the size of the population, the economic clout the city wields and its new status as the world’s number one port in terms of gross tonnage. But these assets and the lingering image of vast factory estates do not conger up a clear agenda for a future role in the international arena. While Shenzhen exploded on to the world stage because of its proximity to Hong Kong, that proximity makes its independent entry into world status impossible. There is no other case of twin cities sharing global status. The very definition of global status (Sassen 2001) makes such a prospect inconceivable in the medium term. In the meantime, Shenzhen can work on the qualities of a world city. The Futian CBD, although undeniably one of the most successful such new CBD ventures in China, lacks vibrancy and a sense of place. While the design analogy with Manhattan and Central Park is clear, New York’s international business heart is not in Central Park but in Midtown. In Shenzhen, the business core is focused on the centrally located green space. In Shenzhen, there is no ‘100% corner’, Whyte’s (1988) famous term for the genius loci of business in a city. It is perhaps for these reasons that the Shenzhen leadership has speculated on yet another CBD in Qianhai, in the vicinity of Shekou, where most of the international activity currently resides.
The repeated overtures to combine forces with Hong Kong to counter the restored power of Shanghai as a world player, have shown signs of some success in recent months. Shenzhen has made many such overtures in the past, only to find Hong Kong fairly unreceptive to cooperative efforts. But a slow recovery in Hong Kong from the 1997 Asian financial crisis and Beijing’s tepid support of Hong Kong may make alliances more attractive to the Hong Kong administration. So what role can Shenzhen play internationally? As discussed below concerning its internal development, the city may continue to work on its internal development in efforts to make it attractive to corporate world players, including those based in China. The city enjoys substantial assets including climate, waterfront, access to natural environment and some of the best transportation infrastructure available anywhere. Even as Hong Kong worries about its ability to retain a highly trained workforce in the face of a worsening environment, so Shenzhen must also work hard to win back those environmental conditions that make new investment a possibility. The city is young and dynamic, but lacks quality educational institutions and their related research and development activities. In general, the city will have to work on the basic social, economic and educational infrastructure to make it attractive to high-level inward investment. Key economic sectors will emerge, following other world cases, but not before basic conditions are met.
Now we turn to Shenzhen’s regional role. It is well accepted that urban regions in the contemporary world develop substantial autonomy and stability for the individual players within the region by clearly defining the role of each. In the case of the Netherlands or northern Germany, where a constellation of small cities grew up independently, their individual futures became tied to the economic structure of the region. A single, large labour market supported distinct economic roles for the individual cities that became increasingly differentiated. A friendly competition between centres may well characterize the cities of the Rhein-Ruhr-Gebiet or the Randstad, but key decisions on infrastructure, for example, are reserved at the national level in the case of the Netherlands, or at the länder level in Germany. Such is not yet the case in Guangdong province, where individual cities have acted independently and in parallel with efforts in the other cities. One result has been a proliferation of airports with international pretensions, with no less than five such airports that are no more than 40 minutes apart by high speed train, when that network is complete–Shenzhen’s Bao’an airport joins Hong Kong’s Chek Lap Kok, Guangzhou International Airport, Zhuhai International Airport and Macau International Airport.  Such excessive investment for the passenger volumes will weigh heavily in the future when such investment capital will be needed for more basic urban improvements.
A similar effort can be seen in port development. Shenzhen’s two ports will soon compete with Guangzhou’s own port at Nansha.  
The new CBDs of Shenzhen and Guangzhou are identical in mission, right down to the cultural institutions they house, the character of the buildings and even the overall urban design. The proliferation of such CBDs diminish their power to attract and sacrifice qualities of place for a somewhat brutal branding effort. But now that those CBDs are on the ground, or are in the throes of development, as in Zhuhai and Dongguan, they may yet undergo another thorough effort at making them world-class. The most recent example of such an effort in Asia can be seen in the Marunouchi district of central Tokyo, Japan’s premier office district and arguably of world-class status. When it first developed in the 1960s, that office district was also criticized as generic and lifeless, a chequerboard of indifferent office blocks with little else to recommend it. Renewed buildings, refined and walkable streets, quality services and links to public transport have made the Marunouchi hot property and quite distinct from any other office district in Japan, including the internationally known Shinjuku CBD. A walk through the Futian CBD has none of these characteristics and certainly none of the excitement of a 42nd Avenue in New York. The very locations of the CBDs of Shenzhen and Guangzhou should suggest their respective roles in the regional context. For example, Guangzhou can more legitimately claim command status for the provincial economy, including new centres of production that lie on infrastructure that has Guangzhou has the hub. Shenzhen, on the other hand, could seek to capture those activities squeezed by Hong Kong’s small and relatively expensive office market but can relinquish claims to command status. 
The rapid build-up of transportation infrastructure between the cities of the PRD is equalizing locational advantages, particularly in the vicinity of the railway hubs. Dongguan benefits substantially from its location mid-way between Guangzhou and Shenzhen, for example. If the experience of other city regions is any guide, a mobile and increasingly affluent workforce will choose to live in one locality and work in another, if local conditions are favourable. In this context, it is likely that the disparities in environmental quality, income and attractiveness that have begun to characterise parts of Shenzhen will visit the system of cities in exactly the same way. For example, new luxury housing is once again under development in the Luohu district, which enjoys high accessibility to both Hong Kong and the cities to the north. 
The growth scenario, while favoured by local government, is looking more and more a challenge, particularly in a restructuring environment where there is serious decline in numbers of jobs across whole sectors of the economy. Shenzhen will also have to deal with the comparative advantages of the other major cities of the Pearl River Delta. Hong Kong is within commuting distance and has a highly developed service sector with which Shenzhen cannot compete. While Shenzhen offers substantially lower operating costs to commercial activities, Dongguan offers even lower operating costs. The relative decline of Guangzhou in the Pearl River Delta economic area has also been vigorously addressed locally through various infrastructure reconstruction projects and major real estate initiatives (Xu and Yeh, 2005). With Shenzhen and Guangzhou clearly competing for a certain status and role within the province, such initiatives are intended to address the local competition. 
City finances in Shenzhen, as is the case for all the major cities of the eastern seaboard of China, are challenged by a diminishing land resource. While many cities have proposed substantial expansion of the urban area to meet needs and generate revenues, there is growing consensus that cities need a more sustainable source of finance capital. Changes in how cities finance themselves are being discussed (Deng and Huang, 2004). If cities move to sustained revenue from leased land, it is all but certain that attention will be further focussed on regeneration efforts in older, devitalised areas of the city.
Another argument for long-term stability in the urban land resource is the diminishing return, together with increasing congestion and amenity losses that accompany extensive spatial growth, especially on fixed infrastructure. Such consequences of growth might help explain the tendency for Chinese cities to exhibit an attenuating growth curve as the population increases (Anderson and Ge, 2005). The environmental problems of the eastern seaboard in general have increasingly been cited popularly as reasons for the departure of some industry from these regions, although the empirical evidence is not yet available.
The first two decades of development in the PRD were characterized by epoch-making growth that seemed without end. The literature on economic developments in the PRD during that time emphasise the break with the command economy, the loosening ties with Beijing and the gathering economic clout of Guangdong province within China. More recent developments have prompted a more temperate view, as other regions of the eastern seaboard gain ascendancy, and the pioneering efforts in Guangdong are generalised throughout China.  That less assured future for the whole of the PRD could well be regarded as salutary, however. The individual cities are professing faith in cooperation openly in a whole range of areas. Those generally stated intentions to share in a common future are actually translating into some concrete actions. The PRD was first on the ground with high-speed rail, for example, ahead of the service now in operation between Beijing and Tianjin. Other examples of carefully considered common projects are likely to follow, as cities see the need to take long-term planning more seriously. These developments might be regarded merely as signs of maturation, sophistication and diversification–in other words, what all urban regions face in a globalising world.
Now we turn to an overview of Shenzhen’s internal development to 2020.
	While the overall shape and texture of Shenzhen is beginning to stabilize, the internal form and activity structure of the city remain in flux in 2009. For example, Huaqiangbei emerged suddenly and grew rapidly as a commercial and electronics wholesale centre in the mid-1990s. Other such transformations are ongoing. Such transformations were facilitated by the city having allocated a large proportion of the first city plan to industrial use, which is more easily transformable to other uses according to statutory requirements. Locating line 1 of the metro system (MRT)  introduced new travel dynamics and a consequent plan to locate new shopping centres at locations directly connected to the metro stations. It is this internal structure which, ironically, is becoming less clear even as the geographic character of Shenzhen as a whole stabilises.
	Shenzhen also enjoys some significant advantages, having undertaken extensive, large-scale urban planning from the very beginning. Shenzhen’s population is remarkably well housed, considering how fast it has grown. Homelessness is practically non-existent while the housing market remains vibrant. Outside the villages, urban development is of good quality virtually everywhere, orderly and well coordinated. While the heavy hand of large-scale planning is everywhere in evidence, Shenzhen improved considerably on the deficiencies of Hong Kong’s own developments in its rapid growth phase. Even the villages, while often offering housing of poor quality, have street environments that are lively, walkable and safe. While the overall land use distributions have respected the original plans and subsequent additions, control of individual projects has been much more difficult. The one-off negotiations on major development projects, even if the uses and density were respected, led to discordant results and opportunities for graft. The missing regulatory framework that accompanies development throughout the developed world is now being addressed in the whole of Shenzhen. That mammoth task of writing regulatory controls for every piece of developable property is a major ongoing effort of the local government that will undoubtedly bear fruit in a few years. Once implemented, such a regulatory system, within the statutory planning system of the city, will be a first in China.
The relatively complete road network, with its generous provisions, constitutes a significant asset in the long run picture of a mixed transport system. Many urban roads are vastly over-designed, with as many as twelve lanes. It is likely several lanes fewer could handle the same vehicular throughput, particularly since Shenzhen opted to retain single-level intersections at ground level. The great damage caused by so-called ‘fly-overs’ in many other cities was studiously avoided in Shenzhen, making conversion to a multi-modal future easier. The same arguments that led to the elimination of bicycle lanes in favour of extra car lanes in 1999 prevail today with regard to excess vehicular road surface. Shenzhen did not adopt Guangzhou’s approach to force pedestrians to cross major streets on bridges, although the city has implemented a limited bridge plan in recent years. The need to rapidly increase ridership on the MRT will necessitate a rethinking of local design, including improved walking routes with more supporting facilities around the metro stations. Shenzhen is one of the best candidate cities in China for re-introduction of the bicycle, given the space available on the roads and the substantial distances between housing estates and local metro stations. Workplaces are generally well connected to the MRT, but housing is not. Modest patronage of the fledgling metro system will remain a problem until the city commits to thorough transformation of the local walking environment around the metro stations. The city has undertaken some planning efforts in this regard in recent months but there is as yet no single example of improvement on the ground.
	As Shenzhen and the PRD generally undergo economic restructuring, there is a need to consider market-led economic transformation of the city and the development of new industries, especially creative industries. The city has experimented with the recycling of former factory buildings in Futian district to make a new arts community. The galleries, designers’ and publishers’ offices which have filled the spaces are intended to instigate a creative adaptation of the economy to ideas and innovative products. Although a new city, Shenzhen has substantial areas that are suitable to this kind of enterprise. Just how the city should begin this transformation and what measures are most suitable remains a question much addressed everywhere. Cities such as Taipei in Taiwan have linked such recycled factory buildings with schools of design and planning. Its own economic restructuring is part of an outreach, enabling young entrepreneurs and design professionals to enter the Chinese market from the Taipei base. Shenzhen also has significant manpower in planning, design and business management, but there is no loci for these activities, no showplace for product and service innovation. The salaries paid to professionals in these fields are among the highest in China. The various firms are scattered across the city and do not link with any formal training activity, indeed any university of significant standing. The firms regularly recruit in Shanghai and Beijing and are hard pressed to retain talented staff in the long term. It will surely be one of Shenzhen’s next challenges to launch academic institutions that are highly attractive to candidates from throughout China, but also from abroad. 
	One of the most important challenges ahead involves the urban villages, now almost fully redeveloped as dormitory districts. The legal necessity of working directly with village authorities may turn out to be a golden opportunity to invent new spaces with distinct character and purpose that would be difficult to derive from the usual top-down agenda that dominates in cities such as Shenzhen. The numbers of such cases and opportunities are bound to increase in the coming years as the depletion of the land resource shifts interest to erstwhile developed territory such as urban villages. The impact on spatial planning will also not be without consequence. The organic configurations of village lands within the modernist vision of planned Shenzhen would appear to be a poor fit, but offer an interesting opportunity to innovate in a formal sense. Having built up as largely non-motorised environments, such villages also offer an interesting opportunity to join a network of more sustainable new communities as the anticipated third wave of regeneration washes across Bao’an and Longgang districts.
	In the heady early days, Shenzhen was always in the frontline of urban experimentation, the closely watched urban laboratory for all of China. However, as the city has become large and economically powerful, a new conservatism has set in. An established economic elite dominates policy formulation and manages the city for its own ends, including profit-taking. In sharp contrast with the early years of many small and medium-sized enterprises, industrial and corporate monopolies are emerging that are exercising control over lands and economic development. Urban planning has increasingly to balance the interests of private monopolies, public interest and long-term development. The latest comprehensive plans, discussed in this paper, are a product of these planning compromises.
In the name of urban regeneration, early-developed districts in the central area have attracted the attention of private interest groups, who have convinced the government to launch renewal efforts. Latest fashion architecture, a clean and ordered streetscape and manucured landscaping, all delivered by the planning system, contribute to the increase of land value and housing price. Lower income residents are driven out, replaced with wealthy residents and speculative buyers, leading to a sharp decrease in social mix and growing social polarisation. The urban villages are obvious targets for these regeneration efforts, which offer a ‘win-win’ outcome for three key actors. The government gains revenue by first acquiring village land, then auctioning it. Developers profit by engaging in contractual arrangements with the government, with no public accountability. The villagers earn money from the sale of their lands and are typically offered subsidized, high-quality housing in replacement. The low-income population residing in the villages lose on all counts: They lose their homes, their social networks and even their employment if they are unable to secure replacement housing within reasonable travelling distance.
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Figure 1. Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ), its three districts and the two outlying districts, along with the major transport infrastructure

Figure 2. Population growth of the SEZ and the whole of Shenzhen

Figure 3. Proposed rail infrastructure in the 2007-2020 Plan. Source: Shenzhen Comprehensive Development Draft Plan, 2007-2020

Figure 4. The 1986 Plan of Shenzhen, encompassing the Shenzhen Economic Zone (SEZ)

Figure 5. The 1996-2010 Plan of Shenzhen, adapted from Shenzhen Urban Planning & Land Administration Bureau (2000) Shenzhen Comprehensive Plan (1996-2010)

Figure 6. Urban village lands in Shenzhen. Source: Shenzhen Urban Planning and Land Administration Bureau, 2004

Figure 7. Motor vehicle and private car ownership in Shenzhen over time

Figure 8. Xiasha village in Futian district, Shenzhen. Photo credit: Zhu Rongyuan and Zhou Jun, CAUPD.

Figure 9. The urban design plan with major axes of development. Source: Shenzhen Urban Planning & Land Administration Bureau, 2007: Shenzhen Comprehensive Development Draft Plan 2007-2020

Figure 10. The 1984 and 1994 built-up territory, derived from satellite imagery. Built-up is defined as predominantly buildings or building plots together with urban infrastructure. The minimum unit dimension is 100 m square



































